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THE GHOST OF ALAN FREED: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MERIT AND
PURPOSE OF ANTI-PAYOLA LAWS IN TODAYS
MUSIC INDUSTRY
"Alan Freed may merely have been born too soon; playing records on
the radio may have gotten him in trouble with the law, but he probably
could have been a highly respected and successful grocer."
1
I. INTRODUCTION
As state and federal officials renew the battle cry against the seemingly
pervasive practice of record companies plying radio stations with funds or
valuable goods to obtain airplay for songs, the debate continues as to
whether such restrictions are necessary, and if so, in what form.2 With one
major record label bound by restrictions on its pay-for-play activities and
saddled with a ten million dollar settlement, it seems that a change is in
the wind for the music industry as a whole.3 Yet the underlying questions
remain whether the laws are adequately designed to deal effectively with
1. Bob Greene, Payola, Part 2-Will Anyone Even Notice?, CHI. TRIB., June 24,
2001, at C2. Alan Freed was noted for reviving radio during an era when its biggest
stars were turning to television. See Radio Hall of Fame, Disc Jockey, Alan Freed,
http://www.radiohof.org/discjockey/alanfreed.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2006) (of-
feing Freed's biography). From the start of his career in radio, Freed featured
rhythm and blues and rock 'n' roll's early performers. See id. (same). "Freed's
endorsement of rhythm and blues-and his subsequent popularity with both black
and white teenagers-made him a lightning rod for both racists and musical con-
servatives." Id. Despite his involvement in the 1959 payola scandal, he is
remembered for his contributions to radio and was inducted into the Radio Hall
of Fame in 1988. See id. (noting Freed made rock 'n' roll and Top 40 indispensa-
ble part of radio). For a further discussion of Freed's involvement with payola
scandal, see infra notes 26, 29 and accompanying text.
2. See Brian Garrity, Payola Probe Fallout Begins, BILLBOARD, Aug. 7, 2005, availa-
ble at LEXIS, BILLBD File (noting that attorney general views Sony BMG settle-
ment as merely beginning of reforms in record industry); see also Marc Fisher,
Paying for Airplay: The Beat Goes On, WASH. PosT, Aug. 7, 2005, at N06 (describing
findings of New York investigation); Press Release, Office of New York State Attor-
ney General Eliot Spitzer, Sony Settles Payola Investigation (July 25, 2005), availa-
ble at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2005/jul/jul25a_05.html (detailing extent
of investigation).
3. See generally Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to Executive Law Sec-
tion § 63(15), In the Matter of Sony BMG Music Entertainment, Attorney General
of the State of New York (July 22, 2005), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/
press/2005/jul/payola.pdf [hereinafter Assurance of Discontinuance] (describing
investigation's findings of payola practices at Sony's record labels). Others likely
to be affected by Sony's settlement include the three other major record labels-
Warner Music Group, Vivendi Universal Music Group and EMI Music Group-all
of which are still under investigation by the New York Attorney General's office.
See Garrity, supra note 2 (reporting executives at other major record companies
were initially flippant about effects of Sony settlement). Further, the FCC has an-
nounced that it will review the settlement terms for evidence of payola infractions.
(695)
1
Repyneck: The Ghost of Alan Freed: An Analysis of the Merit and Purpose of
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
the perceived problem of payola, and whether payola is even a problem at
all .4
The trade magazine Variety coined the term "payola" in 1938 to refer
to the practice of making undisclosed payments or exchanges of value in
return for inclusion of material in radio broadcasts. 5 Payola scandals have
been a part of the music industry throughout the past, most notably in the
1950s and 1960s and again in the 1980s.6 While the practice has decidedly
changed in form since its inception, "[p]aying for songs has been almost
standard operating procedure for years and years." 7
In the forty-five years since the enactment of federal anti-payola stat-
utes, the practice has not only remained prevalent, but has developed into
a sophisticated system of exchange between record companies and radio
conglomerates. 8 A recent investigation by the New York State Attorney
See U.S. to Revisit Payola Inquiry, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 9, 2005, at C3 (citing "mountain of
evidence" collected by Spitzer).
4. See Robert Hilburn, Critic's Notebook: The Public, Not Payola, Rule the Air, L.A.
TIMES, July 29, 2005, at El (asserting payola not controlling force in music indus-
try); Jacob Slichter, Price of Fame, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2005, at A23 (describing art-
ists' conflicted feelings over necessity of payola).
5. See Lauren J. Katunich, Comment, Time to Quit Paying the Payola Piper: Why
Music Industry Abuse Demands a Complete System Overhaul, 22 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REv.
643, 644 (2002) (providing brief overview of history of payola); see also Commission
Warns Licensees About Payola and Undisclosed Promotion, 4 F.C.C.R. 7708, 7709
(1988) (reminding that payola violations are infractions of United States Criminal
Code and may subject broadcasters to sanctions under Communications Act); J.
Gregory Sidak & David E. Kronemyer, The "New Payola" and the American Record
Industry: Transactions Costs and Precautionary Ignorance in Contracts for Illicit Services,
10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 521, 521 (1987) (analyzing forces that promote payola
throughout history of radio industry). The word "payola" was formed as a contrac-
tion of the words "pay" and "Victrola," an old fashioned record player. See Michael
Gormley, Sony BMG Music Agrees to $10 Million "Payola" Settlement, Lnw.coM, July 26,
2005, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=l 122294925140 (briefly describing
background of payola).
6. See Katunich, supra note 5, at 645 (commenting on scandals of 1950s and
1960s). The scandals of the 1960s prompted passage of the federal anti-payola
statutes. See id. (discussing impact of 1960s payola scandals). Those in the 1980s
introduced the independent promoter and what appeared to be a more developed
system for exchanging consideration. See id. at 645-46 (discussing impact of more
recent payola scandals).
7. See Charles Duhigg & Walter Hamilton, Paying a Price, L.A. TIMES, July 26,
2005, at Al (describing common use of payola). For a discussion of the ways in
which the practice of payola has changed since its inception, see infra notes 18-20
and accompanying text.
8. See Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 3, at 5 (claiming that simple
bribes to local deejays have become elaborate corporate strategy). Following large
scale consolidation among radio stations in the wake of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, record company executives are able to negotiate promotion deals for
acquiring airplay across a large number of stations serving a variety of geographic
markets. See id. (noting radio conglomerates negotiate large-scale promotion deals
for airplay across United States). It is the fundamental conflict between views on
proper allocation of radio airtime that drives the continuing controversy over pay-
for-play practices in the United States, raising concerns about the efficacy of the
current laws at curtailing payola and the potential need for reform or repeal. See
[Vol. 51: p. 695
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General's Office has drawn national attention to the issue of payola prac-
tices in the music industry. 9 Current federal law prohibits payment for the
broadcast of material only when such payment is not disclosed to the lis-
tener.10 Moreover, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has
carved out several exceptions to the statute through its administrative
hearings.1" The result is a statutory scheme riddled with loopholes
through which record companies and radio stations continue to conduct
their pay-for-play. 12
This Note analyzes federal anti-payola regulations, concludes that cur-
rent laws are ineffective in curtailing undisclosed payments for broadcast
and proposes that the laws be restructured to reflect the commodity mar-
ket of radio. Part II summarizes the history of payola practices in the
United States and discusses the fact that, despite legislative investigations
in the 1960s, payola continues to flourish throughout the record indus-
try. 13 Part III provides a precis of current federal anti-payola regula-
tions.1 4  Part IV offers criticism of current anti-payola regulations,
describes the facts and impact of New York authorities' investigation and
generally 149 CONG. REc. S1669 (2002) (expressing desire for reform of current
federal payola laws); Statement of Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein (Aug. 8,
2005), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-
260453Al.pdf (noting airwaves belong to public); Letter from Columbia Records
Executive Vice President, In the Matter of Sony BMG Music Entertainment (Feb.
6, 2003), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2005/jul/payola2.pdf
[hereinafter Sony Correspondence] (indicating record company views airtime as
scarce commercial resource).
9. See generally Garrity, supra note 2 (describing findings of New York inquest);
Arshad Mohammed, FCC Plans Payola Investigation, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2005, at
D02 (reporting that FCC plans further investigation of possible violations of fed-
eral payola laws in wake of New York inquiry); Assurance of Discontinuance, supra
note 3 (containing findings of investigation that were published on state attorney
general's website).
10. See Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 317 (a) (1) (2000). The Act provides:
All matter broadcast by any radio station for which any money, service or
other valuable consideration is directly or indirectly paid, or promised to
or charged or accepted by, the station so broadcasting, from any person,
shall, at the time the same is so broadcast, be announced as paid for or
furnished, as the case may be, by such person.
Id.
11. See Kaye-Smith Enter., 71 F.C.C.2d 1402, 1408 (1979) (setting forth
"friendship exception").
12. See Eric Boehlert, Record Companies: Save Us from Ourselves!, SALON.COM,
Mar. 13, 2002, http://archive.salon.com/ent/feature/2002/03/13/in-
diepromotion/index.html (noting that industry observers find FCC rules to be
"antiquated and inefficient").
13. For a discussion of various payola scandals and investigations in United
States history and their impact (or lack thereof) on curtailing payola, see infra
notes 18-29 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the development of current federal anti-payola stat-
utes, see infra notes 39-61 and accompanying text.
NOTE20061
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settlement with Sony and debates the merits of payola regulations. 15 Fur-
ther, Part IV explores opposing views on the necessity of payola regulation
and concludes that current methods of obtaining airplay come at a high
cost to the industry, artists and the public; therefore, some revision of cur-
rent regulations is necessary. 1 6 Hoping to induce further discussion of a
balanced solution to this decades-old debate, Part V proposes adjustments
to the current structure of the payola regulations to account for the scarce
nature of the valuable resource of broadcast radio airtime.17
II. DEVELOPMENT OF PAYOLA
A. Payola and Public Scandal
Payola has influenced the music industry from its earliest days, with
some instances dating back to the 1800s and the sale of sheet music.1 8
15. For a more detailed discussion of the Sony investigation, see infra notes
111-30 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the impact of the Sony settlement in light of previous
anti-payola actions on the part of record companies, see infra notes 13149 and
accompanying text.
17. For an analysis of several viewpoints on necessary revisions to current fed-
eral payola restrictions, see infra notes 203-25 and accompanying text.
18. See Richard Kielbowicz & Linda Lawson, Unmasking Hidden Commercials in
Broadcasting: Origins of the Sponsorship Identification Regulations, 1927-1963, 56 FED.
COMM. L.J. 329, 349 (2004) (describing evolution of payola from 1800s to present);
Cliff Doerksen, Broken Record, N.Y. TiMES, July 29, 2005, at A23 (documenting ori-
gins of payola). Music publishers at the end of the nineteenth century hired no-
madic vaudeville performers to incorporate their melodies on the music theatre
circuits in order to increase the audiences for their music. See Kielbowicz & Law-
son, supra, at 349 (introducing first appearance of payola in music industry). "If
audiences liked what they heard, the publishers would profit from the sale of copy-
righted sheet music." Doerksen, supra. Under this nascent pay-for-play system,
performers could earn almost as much from payola as they could from their theat-
rical salaries. See id. (noting even non-musical acts could profit from "trickle-down
benefit" of payola system).
With the introduction of silent movies, the same publishers turned their atten-
tion to theatre organists, and supplied inducements for their melodies to be
played along with the films. See id. (describing new payola-supported class of enter-
tainers). As sound was incorporated into film, the promotional deals were aimed
at the movie studios producing the movies. See id. (indicating payola's opportunis-
tic qualities). All seemed to be going well for the music publishers until the advent
of radio. See id. (recognizing similarities between publishers' reactions to radio
and reactions to advent of internet by today's radio conglomerates). To the pub-
lishers, radio seemed to overexpose songs before they reached the height of their
market value. See id. (describing prior life cycle of songs as maximum of two
years). In fact, radio served to broaden the market for hit songs and, simultane-
ously, shorten the life cycle of those songs. See id. (noting it used to take months to
"infect the public with hunger for a particular tune"). This combination allowed
for more songs to be exploited as "cash cows." See id. (noting song life cycles short-
ened from months to weeks).
By the 1930s, one radio network openly contemplated charging music pub-
lishers a flat rate for each exposure of a song. See id. (claiming NBC's plan was
thwarted by era's star bandleaders). Standing in their way, however, were ban-
dleaders and singers loath to see their own payola profits reduced. See id. (assert-
698 [Vol. 51: p. 695
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The practice spread to radio by the 1930s, when some bands accepted
payments to endorse particular songs on their radio shows. 19 Yet it was in
the 1950s that payola truly blossomed in radio, feeding off competition
between independent record labels and established companies.2 0 Payola
stems from a basic economic concept: far more records are released each
week than the finite airtime available can accommodate; as a result, payola
acts as a pricing mechanism to allocate the scarce resource of airtime ex-
posure to new songs in accordance with basic theories of supply and de-
mand.21 Nevertheless, for policy reasons, Congress proscribed the
practice in the 1960s and subjected violators to criminal penalties.2 2 The
ing bandleaders and singers would never have accepted interference with their
own payola arrangements). Nevertheless, by the 1940s, deejays began sharing in
the spoils of payola. See id. (describing decline of bandleaders in favor of disc
jockeys at close of 1940s). For a detailed history of payola in America and En-
gland, from its origins in music publishing through the drugs and paper adds of
the early 1990s, see KERRY SEGRAVE, PAYOLA IN THE Music BUSINESS: A HISTORY,
1880-1991 (1994).
19. See Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 18, at 350 (explaining development
of payola in radio).
20. See id. (recognizing that changes in radio were prompted by competition
from television and inception of rock 'n' roll); Michael Roberts, Playola,
WEsTwORD, Oct. 18, 2001, http://www.westword.com/issues/2001-10-18/mes-
sage.html (summarizing early payola scandals among radio deejays).
21. See Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 521 (articulating economic incen-
tives behind payola practices); Katunich, supra note 5, at 645 (observing that finite
airtime generates competition); see also Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 533
(noting Top 40 stations may receive fifty or more singles each week, yet have mere
three to four play list slots open for new releases).
The supply and demand chain in the music industry model is comprised of
record companies and radio stations. See Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 521
(describing market participants). The domestic record industry currently consists
of four major companies: Sony BMG Music Entertainment, Warner Music Group,
Vivendi Universal Music Group and EMI Music Group. See Assurance of Discontin-
uance, supra note 3, at 2 (reporting Sony is "one of the four major record compa-
nies"); Chris Morris & Alexander Woodson, $10 Mil Fine for Sony BMG in Payola
Probe, HOULLWOODREPoRTER.COM, July 27, 2005, available at LEXIS, THR File (not-
ing that other three majors are Universal, EMI and Warner). A record company is,
in its simplest form, "a vertically integrated company capable of acquiring and de-
veloping talent.., and manufacturing and distributing prerecorded music." Sidak
& Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 525. At the other end of the industry are 10,000
commercial radio stations which license a portion of the national airwaves. See Eric
Boehlert, Pay for Play, SALON.COM, Mar. 14, 2001, http://archive.salon.com/ent/
feature/2001/03/14/payola/index.html (explaining that record companies rely
on about 1,000 of those stations to create hit songs). Radio stations, unlike record
companies, "are competing providers of a public good-namely, the free broad-
cast of music, news, sports, and other entertainment." See Sidak & Kronemyer,
supra note 5, at 526 (noting that most common radio format is Contemporary Hit
Radio, also known as Top 40 radio). Popular Top 40 radio stations compete for
listeners based on the attractiveness and predictability of their rather repetitive
portfolio of hit singles. See id. (explaining portfolios are based on restricted list of
nationally ranked singles).
22. See 47 U.S.C. § 508 (2000) (requiring disclosure of payola and imposing
criminal penalties for violators); Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 522 (com-
menting on limited applicability of section 508). For a further discussion of con-
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effect was a promotional culture in which songs, records and performers
contended with each other to obtain more broadcast exposure than their
competitors.
2 3
A House of Representatives investigation revealed that payola was al-
ready a pervasive issue in radio, involving almost every aspect of the music
business. 24 The investigation into payola began in November 1959, follow-
ing another widely publicized investigation into quiz show fraud, and was
prompted by a letter alleging the great extent to which payola influenced
music selection in radio.25 The House committee called famed deejays
such as Dick Clark, of American Bandstand notoriety, and Alan Freed,
often credited with coining the term "rock 'n' roll," to testify about their
participation in the payola scandal. 26 Dick Clark's appearance before the
committee revealed that payola practices intertwined with every part of the
music and broadcast industries, from recording and distributing compa-
nies to talent agencies. 27 In fact, Clark supposedly had connections with
"six small music publishing houses, seven small recording companies, two
distributing companies, one record pressing company, two production
companies and one talent agency."28 While Clark was thereafter merely
required to divulge his financial interests in music enterprises, Freed even-
tually pled guilty to charges of commercial bribery, thereby effectively end-
ing his career.29
B. The Curious Nature of Record Promotion
Notwithstanding the public outrage following revelations of airplay
bought and sold, members of the music industry realize that it is the
unique nature of both record promotion and radio that combine to make
pay-for-play such an appealing practice to everyone from deejays to CEOs
gressional and administrative restrictions on payola, see infra notes 39-61 and
accompanying text.
23. See Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 18, at 350 ("Payola afflicted all stages
of the music industry, from composers angling to land recording contracts to re-
cord promoters bribing deejays for more airtime."). Some deejays involved in
payola practices received several thousand dollars per year, more than double
their salaries. See id. (noting other payola included expensive holiday gifts).
24. See id. at 348 (discussing findings of House of Representatives'
investigation).
25. For a more detailed discussion of the House payola investigation, see infra
note 43 and accompanying text. The widespread nature of payola came to light as
a result of the House Special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight's investiga-
tion into rigged quiz shows. See Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 18, at 347 (noting
both scandals "merged in the public's mind to form one image of commercialism's
corrupting influence on broadcasting").
26. See id. (reporting that public followed exposes in popular press). In fact,
"Clark expressed surprise about the uproar over payola and denied that he had
violated broadcast regulations." Id.
27. See id. at 351 (describing Clark's testimony before House committee).
28. Id.
29. See id. (indicating Clark's level of involvement); Roberts, supra note 20
(chronicling demise of Alan Freed).
[Vol. 51: p. 695
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of record companies.3" Record promotion entails securing radio airplay
for newly released songs; airplay is essentially advertising for new albums
that allows the consumer to preview the product before purchase. 3 1 In
fact, it is undisputed that "radio airplay is the single most significant driver
of music sales." 32 But there is a finite amount of airtime available and the
limited availability of radio airplay is further compounded by the short
lifecycles of most songs.3 3 Add to this radio's own need to operate as an
economically savvy business and you have the seedlings of a pay-for-play
system.
3 4
Complications in the supply and demand theory arise because radio
stations cannot determine the extent of listener demand for a new song at
the time they must decide whether to add a song to their playlists. 3 5 Be-
cause of this, a highly organized market exists for assessing the broadcast
30. See Katunich, supra note 5, at 646 (noting that while other products and
services can be advertised via other media, this is rarely possible and often ineffec-
tive for songs); see also Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 18, at 348-49 (describing
influence on public opinion by accounts in popular press blaming advertising for
debasing effects on recording industry).
31. See Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 526 (suggesting radio airplay in-
forms consumer of availability of new products).
32. Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 3, at 2; accord Sidak &
Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 526 (identifying radio as most important vehicle for
record sales); see also Chuck Philips, Payola Probe Focuses on Latin Music Airplay, L.A.
TIMES, June 4, 1998, at Al (noting many people purchase songs heard on radio
based on assumption that those are best available). The more exposure a song
receives, the more people are likely to hear it and purchase it. See Nobody In
Particular Presents, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc'ns, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d 1048,
1060 (D. Colo. 2004) ("[R]adio air play of [record labels'] records and live con-
certs by their artists are essential to generate demand for the records them-
selves."); Carlye Adler, Backstage Brawl, FORTUNE SMALL Bus., Mar. 4, 2002, at
170[C] ("For a band, airplay is like oxygen-without it, you die."); see also Assur-
ance of Discontinuance, supra note 3, at 2 (noting connection between song chart
positions and sales figures). Further, increased airplay is reflected in the published
charts purporting to reflect popularity; the higher a song's rank the more likely
retailers will stock the song and consumers will purchase it. See id. at 2
("[I]ncreased airplay translates into increased sales.").
33. See Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 528 (discussing notoriously short
time frame in which songs must debut on radio stations nationwide). Ron Stone,
an artist manager, notes that, "you only get [twelve] weeks for your record to get
any traction at radio. After [twelve] weeks the next wave of record company sin-
gles come over the breach." Boehlert, supra note 21 (describing need to secure hit
status in short time).
34. See Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 526 (stating that radio stations
compete for listeners on basis of their song portfolios). The Arbitron Ratings
Company estimates audience market shares for radio stations; rates charged for
advertising increase as a station's Arbitron ratings increase. See id. at 527 (describ-
ing connection between popularity of station and advertisers' willingness to buy
airtime). Thus, radio stations face an opportunity cost when choosing to play one
song over another based on its popularity with listeners. See id. (noting that if
audience dislikes song selection, station's audience and advertising rates decline).
35. See id. at 527 (maintaining that such quandaries are exacerbated by short
product life cycle of popular songs).
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value of a new song.36 The process works like this: "Every Tuesday night,
all [Top 40] radio stations polled by the various trade publications submit
their playlists for the week ending that day. Those lists, when aggregated,
become the published national hit records charts."37 It is the object of a
record company's promotion staff to induce a sufficient number of radio
stations to add the song in order to have it reported as a hit single.38
III. ANTI-PAYOLA LAWS AND REGULATIONS
With the passage of the Communications Act of 1934,39 the federal
government obtained broad power to regulate wire and radio communica-
tion across the nation. 40 The purpose of the Act was to ensure efficient
nationwide wire and radio communications at a reasonable cost to the
public. 4 ' The Act vested authority in the newly created FCC to effectuate
36. See id. (declaring that playlists of highly rated radio stations "can be a lead-
ing indicator of eventual consumer demand").
37. Id. at 526. Billboard ranks new singles on the basis of both airplay and sales
of the record; alternatively, Radio & Records ranks singles based solely on airplay,
providing a truer account of a song's success at radio. See id. at 527 (noting that
highly rated song portfolio has immense proprietary value to radio stations); see
also United States v. Goodman, 945 F.2d 125, 126 (6th Cir. 1991) (describing pro-
cess of tallying song popularity at Radio & Records).
38. See Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 527 (describing two factors spur-
ring record companies to seek hit status of songs).
39. Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 151-573 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
40. See Katunich, supra note 5, at 646 (describing government's assumption of
wire and radio regulation).
41. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2005) (enumerating purposes of Act). Note that the
line between programming and advertising, which purportedly exists in the United
States, is not as clear in other parts of the world. See Global Views Vary on Pay-for-
Play, BILLBOARD, May 9, 1998, available at LEXIS, BILLBD File (reporting that dif-
ferent business cultures lead to models vastly different from American version).
But see Kai R. Lofthus, Payola Alleged in Norway, BILLBOARD, Dec. 11, 1999, available
at LEXIS, BILLBD File (documenting Norwegian radio station suspended for sell-
ing "power rotations" for songs). For example, in Italy, radio stations commonly
"present" artists in exchange for having their logo appear on the record and re-
ceiving credit as a co-publisher. See Global Views Vary on Pay-for-Play, supra (noting
this practice was popular in France fifteen years ago but is now completely absent).
In many European countries, pay-for-play is permitted by existing rules governing
advertising; however, programmers doubt the economic efficiencies of buying ad-
vertising space for spins and question the ethics of playlists determined by the
highest bidder. See Mike McGeever, Pay-for-Play Sparks Talk at NAB Europe, BILL-
BOARD, Dec. 19, 1998, available at LEXIS, BILLBD File (debating whether cost of ad
space for "x" number of spins could be better spent by record companies); see also
Global Views Vary on Pay-for-Play, supra (noting increase in pay-for-play not limited to
America). In contrast, payola is illegal in places like Japan and Hong Kong. See id.
(contrasting Asian countries' approach to payola). Yet, as in America, program-
ming can still be influenced through purchases of adjacent advertising. See id.
(noting correlation between number of advertisement spots purchased and num-
ber of spins). This prompts the question of whether government regulation can
ever really curtail payola. See id. (noting other nations face similar payola scandals
where practice is banned).
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its provisions. 4
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Despite the FCC's role in regulating America's airwaves, the House
Special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight actually initiated the first
federal investigation into payola practices in radio. 43 Following the Sub-
committee's inquiry, Congress amended the Communications Act by alter-
ing the existing section 317 and adding section 508 ("Amendments of
1960"). 4 4 While section 508 is commonly referred to as "the payola stat-
ute," it is section 317 that contains the most significant restrictions on the
practice of pay-for-play. 45 This provision requires that a radio station dis-
close to the public, at the time of broadcast, any receipt of significant con-
sideration in exchange for broadcasting certain material, including the
42. See Katunich, supra note 5, at 646 (documenting creation of FCC).
43. See id. at 647 (reporting first investigation began in November 1959). The
House Special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight turned its attention from an
investigation of fixed quiz shows to payola in radio when it received a letter assert-
ing that, "commercial bribery has become a prime factor in determining what mu-
sic is played on broadcast programs and what musical records the public is
surreptitiously induced to buy." See Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 18, at 347
(claiming letter spurred investigations). The investigation of November 1959 fo-
cused primarily on disc jockeys and independent record labels peddling "rock 'n'
roll"; the inquiry revealed numerous instances of bribes and tax evasion at stations
across the country. See id. (detailing investigations by FCC, FTC, state district attor-
neys and United States Attorney General). The investigation was also responsible
for tarnishing the reputations of two notable disc jockeys: Alan Freed, who is often
credited with coining the term "rock 'n' roll," and Dick Clark. See Roberts, supra
note 20 (summarizing history of payola and radio).
44. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 317, 508 (2000). Section 317(a) (1) states:
All matter broadcast by any radio station for which any money, service or
other valuable consideration is directly or indirectly paid, or promised to
or charged or accepted by, the station so broadcasting, from any person,
shall, at the time the same is so broadcast, be announced as paid for or
furnished, as the case may be, by such person.
Id. § 317(a) (1). Section 508 states, in pertinent part:
(a) [A] ny employee of a radio station who accepts or agrees to accept
from any person . . . or any person . . . who pays or agrees to pay such
employee, any money... for the broadcast of any matter over such sta-
tion shall, in advance of such broadcast, disclose the fact of such accept-
ance or agreement to such station.
(b) [A] ny person who, in connection with the production or preparation
of any program or program matter which is intended for broadcasting
over any radio station, accepts or agrees to accept, or pays or agrees to
pay, any money . . . for the inclusion of any matter as a part of such
program or program matter, shall, in advance of such broadcast, disclose
the fact of such acceptance or payment or agreement to the payee's
employer.
Id. § 508(a); see Katunich, supra note 5, at 647 (asserting that Subcommittee was
attempting to prevent recurrence of bribes to deejays).
45. See Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 522 (noting that viewed apart
from section 317, section 508 has narrow scope); see also Katunich, supra note 5, at
647 (documenting same).
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identity of the sponsor.46 The articulated purposes of section 317 and the
more explicit disclosure requirements of 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 function to
inform the listening audience that it is hearing material that has been paid
for, so that the public "know[s] by whom it is persuaded." 47 Section 508,
in turn, requires that radio station employees notify the licensee when
consideration is exchanged for broadcast so that the licensee can arrange
proper disclosure. 48
The Amendments of 1960 were designed to address payments made
to recipients other than the radio station itself, such as disc jockeys or
other employees.49 Nevertheless, neither the original provisions of the
Communications Act nor the Amendments of 1960 actually outlawed the
practice of paying for airplay. 50 Rather, these statutes and their corollary
46. See 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2000); Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 522 (ac-
knowledging that public disclosure is also necessary for licensee disclosures re-
quired under section 508).
47. See Termination of "Plugola" Rulemaking and Affirmation of Disclosure
Requirement, 76 F.C.C.2d 227, 227 (1980) (enumerating purpose of statutes); see
also Nat'l Broad. Co., 27 F.C.C.2d 75, 75 (1970); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (2004) (assert-
ing same principle of public's need to know); Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 18,
at 332 ("Moreover, the sponsorship identification rules express a basic goal of
American communication law and policy: to foster a healthy marketplace of ideas
with minimal government intervention.").
The purpose of the statutes is necessitated by the unique ability of songs to act
as advertisements. See Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 526 (describing songs
as disguised commercials capable of persuasion). "In the case of legitimate adver-
tisements, the identity and commercial interest of the sponsor are apparent from
... the contents of the advertisement itself. Section 317 is concerned with mate-
rial, such as an otherwise innocuous sound recording, that communicates no ap-
parent or ostensible advertising message when broadcast." Id. at 522; see
Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 18, at 331 n.2 ("[Payola] represent[s] disguised
advertising-that is, the audience does not readily recognize the promotional na-
ture of the communication.").
In fact, "[a]s far back as the Radio Act of 1927... there has been an unvarying
requirement that all matter broadcast [in exchange for] valuable consideration ...
be announced as paid for or furnished and by whom." Midwest Radio-Television
Inc., 49 F.C.C.2d 512, 514 (1974) (emphasis omitted) (setting forth appropriate
disclosure); see also Loveday v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1443, 1448-49 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (stat-
ing same). The original disclosure provisions contained in the Radio Act have
largely been incorporated into the current law without significant changes or de-
bate. See id. at 1449-52 (commenting on legislative history of provisions).
48. See Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 522 (noting section 508 actually
addresses limited situation arising between radio station and its employees). Sec-
tion 508 assumes a naive licensee unaware of the actions of its employees, highly
unlikely in this age of power deals brokered at the highest levels of radio and
record entities. See id. (rejecting idea of uninvolved radio licensee in modern ra-
dio business model).
49. See Katunich, supra note 5, at 647 (explaining shortcomings of section 317
discovered in congressional investigation and how shortcomings influenced
Amendments of 1960).
50. See id. at 648 (noting laws purport to regulate payola yet do not explicitly
outlaw it); see also 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2005) (imposing restrictions but not outlawing
payola).
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FCC regulations simply prohibited undisclosed payment for broadcast of
material.
51
The FCC enabled stricter application of the statutory anti-payola laws
via administrative hearings for its radio licensees. 52 These regulations re-
quire disclosure of overt exchanges of consideration for the inclusion of
matter in a radio program, regardless of whether the payment is made to a
third party.5 3 Even nominal amounts of consideration may require disclo-
sure to the public. 54 Further, the FCC has held that determinations about
whether a disclosure must be made are not based on who received the
benefit derived from purchase of broadcast time.55 In fact, following the
51. See Katunich, supra note 5, at 648 (asserting that although technically re-
quired, disclosures are rarely made).
52. See, e.g., Gen. Media Assoc., Inc., 3 F.C.C.2d 326, 327 (1996) (holding that
disclosure provisions apply even when consideration given to third party); KMAP,
Inc., 44 F.C.C.2d 971, 971-72 (1974) (holding nominal amounts of consideration
trigger disclosure provisions); Midwest Radio-Television, 49 F.C.C.2d at 514-15 (not-
ing that mere mention of sponsor's name is inadequate disclosure); Nat'l Broad.
Co., 27 F.C.C.2d at 75 (determining that exact wording of sponsorship disclosure is
left to licensee discretion); Cont'l Broad., Inc., 15 F.C.C.2d 120, 130-31 (1968),
reconsideration granted in part, 17 F.C.C.2d 485 (1969), affd, 439 F.2d 580 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (holding that benefit derived from purchase of broadcast not determinative
of whether identification is necessary); WHAS, Inc., 40 F.C.C. 190, 193 (1964)
(holding that licensee must identify principal rather than agent if there is con-
structive notice of agency relationship).
53. See Gen. Media Assoc., 3 F.C.C.2d at 326-27 (applying disclosure provisions
even in cases of third party consideration). In General Media Associates, the FCC
held that where a hidden payment was made to a third party rather than directly to
the broadcaster, appropriate sponsorship identification was required. See id. at 326
(asserting producer solicited payments from clients who wanted inclusion of cer-
tain information in radio program). The FCC concluded that if the payment had
been received by the radio station rather than General Media, a disclosure would
have been required; therefore, the same underlying policy of section 317(a)(1)
necessitated a disclosure in that case. See id. at 327 (noting General Media had
notified stations that some content had been paid for).
54. See KMAP, 44 F.C.C.2d at 974-75 (holding listener payments to disc jock-
eys to ensure requests would be played required disclosure). But see Kaye-Smith
Enter., 71 F.C.C.2d 1402, 1408 (1979) (holding nominal amounts of consideration
did not trigger disclosure provisions). In order to escape the disclosure require-
ments the item must be furnished to the broadcaster "without charge or at a nomi-
nal charge." See Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 18, at 367 (noting possibility of
circumventing disclosure provisions).
In KMAP, the FCC determined that a radio station violated the disclosure pro-
vision by failing to announce that listeners had sent small amounts of money to
announcers along with their requests for songs, in an attempt to ensure the broad-
cast of the dedications. See 44 F.C.C.2d at 974 (noting that station acknowledged
general counsel's letter recommending disclosure announcement).
55. See Cont'l Broad., 15 F.C.C.2d at 130-31 (holding any individual or agency
purchasing broadcast time must be announced as sponsors). In Continental Broad-
casting, the FCC overturned an examiner's finding that there was no violation of
either section 317(a) (1) or 47 C.F.R. § 73.199(a) from a radio station's failure to
broadcast sponsorships disclosure for indirect payments from freelancers for an
appearance on a radio program, under the theory that their appearance did not
constitute "matter" under the definition in the statute. See id. at 130 (noting exam-
iner's belief that desire for mere personal exposure removed payment from spon-
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1950s investigations and ensuing administrative hearings, the concept of
"sponsor" included "any party maneuvering to influence broadcast con-
tent to promote goods or services." 5 6 Nevertheless, despite the rather ex-
plicit wording for sponsorship disclosures contained in 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.1212, the FCC has held that the exact wording of sponsorship identi-
fication remains in the licensee's discretion, provided that the licensee ad-
equately conveys that the sponsor has paid for program material.
57
The FCC requires licensees to exercise "reasonable diligence" in ob-
taining information that enables them to comply with the requirements of
sections 317 and 508 and associated regulations. 5 8 A licensee who knows
that an agent has made arrangements with a station on behalf of another
must make announcements identifying the principal rather than the agent
as the sponsor.59 Nonetheless, a licensee may safely accept the apparent
sponsor's representations that he or she is the real party in interest, as "[a]
duty to undertake an arduous investigation ought not casually be assigned
to broadcasters. '60 Despite such actions, and because a record's success
remains inextricably linked to radio airplay, members of record compa-
nies and radio stations alike have continued to skirt the confines of payola
laws in an effort to remain on top of the market.61
sorship requirements). Rejecting this theory, the FCC concluded that anything
broadcast in exchange for valuable consideration met the terms of the statute and
required disclosure. See id. at 131 (same); see also 47 U.S.C. § 317(a) (2000) (stat-
ing sponsorship requirements).
56. See Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 18, at 349 (noting expanded view of
sponsors raised questions about scope of section 317).
57. See Nat'l Broad., 27 F.C.C.2d at 75 (requiring announcement to be under-
standable by audience). Note that mere mention of the sponsor's name without
more is inadequate. See Midwest Radio-Television, 49 F.C.C.2d at 514 (requiring in-
clusion of "paid-for" or "sponsored by").
58. See Commission Warns Licensees About Payola and Undisclosed Promo-
tion, 4 F.C.C.R. 7708, 7708 (1988) (holding that reasonable diligence standard
may require higher duty of care for stations whose formats make them particularly
susceptible to payola).
59. See WHAS, Inc., 40 F.C.C. 190, 192 (1964) (calling for disclosure of"true
identity" of sponsor); see also Loveday v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1443, 1449 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(rejecting requirement of arduous investigation for licensee). In WHAS, the licen-
see argued that it had not violated the disclosure requirements because the provi-
sion in the rules is phrased in the disjunctive and contemplates alternative
methods of compliance. See WHAS, 40 F.C.C. at 192-93 (arguing in support of its
announcement of identity of party on whose behalf payments were made). In fact,
the licensee announced the agent who had paid to air material on behalf of an-
other as the sponsor in interest. See id. at 192 (noting failure of station to distin-
guish between real sponsor and apparent sponsor). The FCC rejected this theory
and cited the last sentence of Section 3.654(c) of the rules in its holding: "Where
an agent or other person contracts . . . with a station on behalf of another, and
such fact is known to the station, the announcement shall disclose the identity of
the person . . . in whose behalf such agent is acting .... " Id.
60. See Loveday, 707 F.2d at 1449 (explaining why rigorous investigation not
necessary).
61. See Chuck Philips, Radio Pushes Bands for Freebies, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998,
at Al (noting "[rlecord companies have long tried to influence the programmers
[Vol. 51: p. 695
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol51/iss3/5
IV. CRITICISMS OF ANTI-PAYOLA LAWS AND REGULATIONS
Payola has continued despite all the foregoing restrictions because of
the ability of record labels and radio stations to exploit the structure of the
statutes and their exceptions, and because of a blatant disregard for the
regulations altogether.6 2 Further, the practice has become institutional in
nature, a seemingly inextricable part of the day-to-day workings of the mu-
sic business. 63 Despite agreement among parties on both sides of the issue
that the current system is not healthy for the music business, it appears
unlikely a middle ground approved by all parties will be reached in the
near future.
64
A. Loopholes
1. Role of the Independent Promoter
In order to accomplish the immense task of promoting a new single
across the nation in a timely manner, record companies subcontract with
independent promoters, which allows flexibility as the number of projects
requiring promotion changes. 65 In this capacity, independent promoters
act as brokers for hit singles, providing radio stations with "pertinent infor-
mation and data related to the quality and nature of the recording, its
likely demographic appeal, its advertising support, sales performance and,
ultimately, the likelihood of its public acceptance as a 'hit record.' "66 The
who decide which of more than 5,000 songs offered each year will be played in the
roughly 250 new slots per station in each year").
62. See 47 U.S.C. § 317(a) (1) (2000) (requiring disclosure of material broad-
cast in exchange for consideration); Kaye-Smith Enter., 71 F.C.C.2d 1402, 1408
(1979) (articulating friendship exception). For detailed discussion of how the mu-
sic industry has exploited loopholes in the payola statutes, see infra notes 70-75, 93-
101 and accompanying text.
63. For a discussion of the institutional nature of payola in music, see infra
notes 103-10, 13444 and accompanying text.
64. For a discussion of the universe of arguments for and against payola prac-
tices, see infra notes 158-77 and accompanying text.
65. See Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 528 (detailing that promotion
loads will change for labels with few releases or releases by temperamental and
unpredictable artists). The authors note that if a record company were to keep a
staff of in-house promoters sufficient to handle their peak business times, the cost
would be prohibitive. See id. (claiming that record companies would have excess
staff if they were vertically integrated into promotion to extent necessary to accom-
modate peak loads). Journalist Eric Boehlert notes:
There are 10,000 commercial radio stations in the United States; record
companies rely on approximately 1,000 of the largest to create hits and
sell records .... The indies get paid for every one: $1,000 on average for
an "add" at a Top 40 or rock station, but as high as $6,000 or $8,000
under certain circumstances.
Boehlert, supra note 21. Compare these amounts with the $4,000 paid by Sony
directly to a radio station to obtain airplay for a Franz Ferdinand song on a single
radio station. See Sony Correspondence, supra note 8 (illustrating various ex-
changes for airplay).
66. See Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 529 (quoting reported member of
"The Network" of independent promoters). During the 1980s approximately
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independent promoter's role for record companies is to enkindle enough
clout with playlist creators at radio stations to get a song the airplay
needed for success. 6 7 Following the massive radio consolidation that oc-
curred in the wake of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,68 however,
independent promoters became toll collectors with potentially exclusive
access to almost sixty percent of the top one hundred stations in the
United States.69
Independent promoters achieved a comparative advantage over in-
house company promoters due to their ability to exploit the significant
number of loopholes within sections 317 and 508 and their accompanying
regulations. 70 The enactment of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act 71 (RICO) gave record companies further incentive to
outsource their promotion activities. 72 Though criminalized in the 1960s,
those guilty of payola infractions under sections 317 and 508 faced minor
penalties and infrequent prosecution. 73 With the passage of RICO, how-
ever, record companies faced the potential of treble damages and far
thirty independent promoters dominated the field in a loose cooperative known as
"The Network." See id. at 528-29 (describing background and organization of "The
Network"). Members of "The Network" were often hired together to promote a
single song nationwide. See id. at 529 (explaining how members of "The Network"
performed job of securing playtime on radio stations and promoting records).
Further, "The Network" had exclusive access to playlists at forty-one major radio
stations. See id. (describing how "The Network" members worked together to pro-
mote record nationwide).
67. See id. (describing purpose of independent promoters to record compa-
nies). For in depth discussion of the role of specific human capital (clout) and
exclusive dealing among independent promoters, see id.
68. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C. and 26 U.S.C.).
69. See Boehlert, supra note 21 (noting that while independent promoters
were once scattered across America, they now have firms stretching coast to coast).
Note that independent promoters have made their way into every genre of music.
See Eric Boehlert, Payola City, SALON.COM, July 24, 2001, http://archive.salon.com/
ent/music/feature/2001/O7/24/urban_radio/index.html (explaining how every
genre of music has independent promoters including urban radio that does not
advertise to that fact).
70. See Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 531 (noting specifically that
"friendship exception" immunizes otherwise punishable conduct when performed
by independent promoters).
71. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, Pub. L.
No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2005)).
72. See Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 538 (arguing potential of facing
private treble damages forced promotion out from under auspices of record
companies).
73. See id. at 537 (asserting that small penalties and remote probability of de-
tection provided little negative incentive to record companies). The authors fur-
ther note that the "volume of RICO litigation grew precipitously in the late 1970s
and early 1980s." See id. at 537-38 (explaining how RICO created incentive for
record companies to contract-out record promotion and avoid vertical
integration).
[Vol. 51: p. 695
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2006] NOTE 709
more frequent prosecution by the government.74 Thus, record companies
increasingly shifted their promotions practice to independent promoters
in order to insulate themselves from allegations of wrongdoing.
75
In an effort to further distance themselves from potentially illicit
deals, record companies shied away from express or implied agreements
guaranteeing airplay in return for the purchase of the promoter's ser-
vices. 76 The necessary ambiguities of the agreements that ensued gave re-
cord companies little ability to enforce their covenants. 77 The record
companies' inability to effectively monitor or control the independent
promoters led to opportunistic behavior, often taking the form of rapidly
escalating "add" prices and "paper adds."
78
74. See id. at 537 (explaining sections 317 and 508 were held not to imply
private right of action).
75. See id. at 538 (explicating that pursuant to federal statute governing com-
plicity, record companies could be prosecuted as criminals). Record companies
could face criminal liability if found to aid, abet, counsel, command, induce or
procure acts of payola; or if found to have willfully caused an act of payola. See id.
at 539 (noting many avenues exist to prosecute record companies). A conse-
quence of such laws is the vagueness of contracts between record labels and inde-
pendent promoters. See id. (asserting vagueness reduced liability of record
companies involved in payola).
76. See id. (explaining such incomplete contracts were necessary in order to
minimize record company knowledge, and therefore liability of promoter activity).
77. See id. at 541 (noting that only method of enforcing such contracts was
termination of repeat business).
78. See id. at 543 (explaining paper adds are either deceptions of record com-
panies by independent promoters or failure of independent promoters to per-
form). A paper add occurs when the radio station reports the addition of a song to
its play list to the charting companies, yet never actually airs the song. See id. (not-
ing paper adds are breach of contract). Paper adds are now a rare occurrence due
to Broadcast Data Services (BDS), a company that electronically monitors airplay
in major radio markets and which provides record companies with a detailed
readout of actual airplay. See Boehlert, supra note 21 (claiming paper adds have
been replaced by so-called "lunar rotations"-song spins in early morning hours
which do not risk station ratings).
Record companies' ability to keep tabs on the results of an independent pro-
moter's work, and thus reduce the number of paper adds generating payment
without actual airplay, was greatly enhanced with the emergence of BDS. See Sidak
& Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 553-54 (noting BDS has assisted record companies
ability to monitor airplay). Nonetheless, it was not long before record companies
themselves learned how to manipulate such a service in their own favor. See Assur-
ance of Discontinuance, supra note 3, at 24 (detailing Sony's use of BDS "thumb-
prints" in commercials to artificially inflate airplay charts). Record companies are
unafraid of policing BDS to ensure they get what they pay for from radio stations.
See Sony Correspondence, supra note 8 (detailing airtimes of Celine Dion song at
numerous radio stations).
Despite the introduction of some ability for record companies to monitor the
results of promoters' services, independent promoters are still in a position to act
ostensibly as gatekeepers of radio airwaves. See Duhigg & Hamilton, supra note 7
(illustrating that labels' desperation for airplay fuels payola). Among the corre-
spondence released in the Sony investigation were emails indicating senior staff
members at Sony's Columbia Records were concerned that radio giant Clear
Channel would refuse to air any of Columbia's releases unless more money was
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The typical arrangement between a record company and an indepen-
dent promoter involves a retainer in addition to a separate fee based on
reported airplay, or "adds." 79 The cost of an independent promoter's ser-
vices in breaking a new record can be staggering-approximately
$100,000 to $250,000 per song.8 0 Many times this cost is passed on to
artists by way of a recoupment provision included in their contracts.8 '
Moreover, even if program directors at a radio station discover a song on
their own, or would have played a song without outside encouragement,
the independent promoter will still be paid for the add.8 2 Despite the
high costs, record companies continue to pay promoters because they fear
that refusal to pay risks losing airplay for any artist from the company's
roster.
8 3
Likewise, the system for exchanging funds between record compa-
nies, independent promoters and radio stations has become highly sophis-
exchanged for promotional services. See id. (describing industry practices that
cause continued participation in payola arrangements).
79. See Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 541-42 (stating that many inde-
pendent promoters are hired on project-by-project basis). For a discussion of how
airplay for a song is reported, see supra note 37 and accompanying text. Note that
"adds" are only one source of available income for independent promoters. See
Boehlert, supra note 21 (noting some promoters get retainers for simply calling
radio stations on behalf of songs). Promoters often receive retainers, per-add fees,
"bill-backs" for promotional expenses incurred acquiring radio station favor and
additional fees to increase the number of times a song is played on a particular
station. See id. (reporting that cost of getting song on playlists is entirely separate
from cost to increase spins).
80. See Boehlert, supra note 21 (suggesting record companies rarely know
what has become of money given to independent promoters).
81. See id. (reporting that labels can occasionally get artists to bear costs of
promotion); see also Lynn Morrow, The Recording Artist Agreement: Does It Empower or
Enslave?, 3 VAND.J. ENT. L. & PRAc. 40, 43-44 (2001) (describing recording costs as
advance to artist to be recovered by record company from future royalties earned
by artists). Simply described, record companies cover the costs accrued recording
and promoting an album on the understanding that the artist will pay back those
costs out of the profits. SeeJohn Nova Lomax, Streamlining the Hitmaking Process,
HOUSTON PREss, Nov. 18, 2001, available at http://www.houstonpress.com/issues/
2001-11-08/racket.html (asserting artists have little room to refuse such agree-
ments when signing recording deals). This practice becomes all the more burden-
some upon the realization that record labels receive ninety percent of a record's
profit, as well as retaining the rights to the recording. See id. (noting this dimin-
ishes artists' ability to pay back advances). "In modem times, the recoupment pro-
vision in all record contracts has payback conditions so onerous and unfair that in
many cases, the amount often can never be paid back unless albums achieve
gold-or increasingly, platinum-level sales." Bill Holland, Artists & Lawyers Decry
Contract Clause, BILLBOARD, Oct. 6, 2001, at 1, available at 2001 WLNR 8724585
(arguing standard recording contract resembles loan).
82. See Boehlert, supra note 21 (noting independent promoters would get
paid even if president of record company convinced station to play song).
83. See id. (explaining that labels fear ability of promoters to keep projects off
air until outstanding bills are paid).
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ticated, although hardly more efficient. 84 One alternative to blatant
exchanges of money favored by the radio groups is an artist's pro bono
appearance at a radio station concert.8 5 These concerts bolster the broad-
caster's ratings and popularity, thus increasing potential advertising reve-
nue, all at minimal cost to the station. 8 6 Yet the decision whether to
participate in promotional concerts creates a concern for record compa-
nies about the potential boycott of artists by competing radio stations in
the market, or by stations they refuse to perform for.
87
For example, Chancellor Media radio stations sold A&M Records a
$237,000 marketing campaign built around a series of commercials and
contests to promote the Bryan Adams song, "On A Day Like Today."
8 8
84. See id. (noting that drugs and prostitutes are out and detailed invoices are
in). The Los Angeles Times released internal documents from one independent
promotion company; the documents, known as "banks," indicate the date a station
played a song followed by a dollar amount received from the artist's label. See
Chuck Philips, Logs Link Payments with Radio Airplay, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 2001, at
Al (stating documents implicate all major U.S. record labels in payola practice).
Frequently, payments from record labels passed on to radio stations via indepen-
dent promoters take the form of untraceable American Express gift cards, item-
ized as "promotional funds" for the station to putatively use for t-shirts and
giveaways. See, e.g., Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 3, at 8-13 (describing
exchanges); Eric Boehlert, Fighting Pay-for-Play, SALON.cOM, Apr. 3, 2001, http://
archive.salon.com/ent/music/feature/2001/04/03/payola2/index.html (noting
similar payola exchanges). For a discussion of the various tactics used by Sony
executives to bury what is arguably payola money, see infra notes 113-14 and ac-
companying text.
85. See Philips, supra note 61 (describing how station receives ratings boost
from concert and artists get sales-boosting exposure).
86. See id. (commenting that radio stations loved ratings increase so much
that almost 200 now stage their own shows).
87. See id. (asserting that radio coerces band participation by threatening to
withhold airplay). Critics of the concert quid pro quo deals, often referred to as
"playola," believe such shows undermine the ability of young bands to develop as
successful touring acts. See id. (listing critics' reasons for objections to free radio
show practices). "Critics say the concerts foster one-hit wonders and rob young
bands of the opportunity to polish material in front of small club audiences-a
path followed by nearly every successful touring act, from the Rolling Stones to
Jimmy Buffett." Id. Concerns about the power of radio stations to pull airplay
from an act that refuses to perform at such shows have grown in light of the wide-
spread radio consolidation and ventures into concert promotion since the Tele-
communications Act of 1996. See id. (claiming conglomerates now control airplay,
live venues and more).
88. See Chuck Philips & Michael Hiltzik, Radio Conglomerates Skirt Payola Laws,
Critics Say, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16,1998, at Al (providing details of promotional deal);
see also Frank Saxe & Jeff Silberman, FCC Fines Radio over Adams Deal, BILLBOARD,
Oct. 28, 2000, at 87, available at 2000 WLNR 6564966 (noting paltry fine unlikely to
have chilling effect on payola). See generally BRYAN ADAMS, On a Day Like Today, on
ON A DAY LIKE TODAY (A&M Records 1998). The Chancellor-A&M deal included
promotion of the single on ten stations in six major markets, including Detroit,
Orlando, Philadelphia and Boston. See Philips & Hiltzik, supra (describing agree-
ment). The package included contest giveaways and a commitment from each
station to play a sixty-second commercial for the album ninety-six times over a two
week period, as well as teaser spots for the four Adams concerts. See id. (stating
same).
2006] NOTE
17
Repyneck: The Ghost of Alan Freed: An Analysis of the Merit and Purpose of
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
The song hit the charts and disappeared off radio almost instantane-
ously-except at four major radio stations owned by Chancellor.8 9 Not
coincidentally, Adams was scheduled to perform charity concerts at all
four of the radio stations for free.90 It was not until the Los Angeles Times
reported on the story almost two years later that the FCC investigated-
eventually fining the radio conglomerate for violations of the anti-payola
statute. 91 All of this can arguably be characterized as pay-for-play; yet "the
system today seems to adhere to the letter, if not the spirit, of the payola
laws." 9
2
2. Statutory Loopholes
Sections 317 and 508 prohibit only undisclosed payments for airplay;
arguably so long as radio stations announce that a song has been paid for,
record companies would be free to continue the current practice of mak-
ing payments for broadcast. 93 Additionally, in a 1979 administrative hear-
89. See id. (reporting Chancellor and A&M denied exchange of airplay for
advertising and concerts); Saxe & Silberman, supra note 88, at 87 (noting A&M
threatened to cancel concerts unless agreement for airplay was provided).
90. See Philips & Hiltzik, supra note 88 (detailing artist requirements). For his
part in the deal, Adams was required to record voice-overs for the commercials,
participate in promotional interviews at several of the stations and perform for free
at the radio benefit shows. See id. (describing obligations of Adams in exchange
for promotion of his single). The cost to A&M to transport Adams, his band and
road crew to all of these events was estimated at $250,000-on top of the previ-
ously paid amount. See id. (noting record label complained but did not object).
91. See Saxe & Silberman, supra note 88, at 87 (claiming negative press from
Los Angeles Times prompted radio company to state that it did "not make airplay
decisions based on the sale of these packages"). Two years after the Los Angeles
Times published the details of the deal, and one year after radio giant Clear Chan-
nel acquired the Chancellor stations, the FCC fined Clear Channel a mere $8,000
for violation of the payola laws. See Chuck Philips, Company Town: Clear Channel
Fined Just $8,000 by FCC for Payola Violation, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2000, at C1 (report-
ing only after stories in Los Angeles Times did FCC approach Chancellor for copy of
A&M promotional contract for review); Saxe & Silberman, supra note 88 (noting
same). Compare this to the millions of dollars in recent fines levied on broadcast-
ers who aired "indecent" material; likewise, the fine pales in comparison to the
$237,000 the radio stations received for the deal in the first place. See Philips, supra
(determining promotion price is seven times FCC fine); Saxe & Silberman, supra
note 88, at 87 (same).
92. See Boehlert, supra note 84 (noting that it is possible to circumvent payola
statutes).
93. 47 U.S.C. §§ 317, 508 (2000). Charles Kelley, an enforcement chief in the
mass media division of the FCC notes, "[i]t is permissible for a station to accept
money in exchange for broadcasting something . . . . It's just that they need to
announce that they're doing it in some manner that is clear to their audience."
Neil Strauss, Pay-for-Play Back on the Air but this Rendition Is Legal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
31, 1998, at Al. Nevertheless, stations "are reluctant to pepper their programming
with announcements like '[t]he previous Ricky Martin single was paid for by Sony
Records.'" Boehlert, supra note 21 (claiming many radio stations avoid such an-
nouncements as interruption of flow of broadcast). Moreover, stations have a
vested interest in maintaining the public perception that they sift through piles of
CDs and select the best for their listeners. See id. (claiming such reputation bene-
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ing, the FCC carved out a gaping exception to the existing rules,
commonly known as the "friendship exception."9 4 In Kaye-Smith Enter-
prises,95 the FCC held that "gifts of nominal value or social exchanges be-
tween friends are not 'payola.'"96 Such an exception allows record
companies and radio stations to use a middleman in order to sidestep the
restrictions-virtually anything of considerable value could conceivably be
passed off as a social exchange between friends.
9 7
Compounding the limited reach of the statute and the existing loop-
holes, the FCC has been lax in its oversight of licensees regarding payola
practices, and has imposed only one fine for payola, for $8,000, in the last
decade.98 Any enforcement seems to occur only in the wake of public
fits stations); see also Lomax, supra note 81 (asserting radio stations encourage illu-
sion that only best songs are "cherrypicked" for listeners). Radio stations are able
to flaunt the regulations requiring disclosure due to the lax efforts of the FCC in
enforcing the rules. See Duhigg & Hamilton, supra note 7 (describing Sony's out-
right bribes to stations and deejays).
94. See Kaye-Smith Enter., 71 F.C.C.2d 1402, 1408 (1979) (incorporating li-
censee's argument that services accepted by station employees constituted "social
relationships" outside ambit of disclosure requirements).
95. See id. (considering application for license renewal).
96. See id. at 1408 (stating holding).
97. See Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 531 (asserting "friendship excep-
tion" creates "gaping loophole" in section 508).
98. See Philips, supra note 91 (describing FCC action as "weak slap on the wrist
from a feeble commission that is no match for Clear Channel"). Previously, the
only extensive enforcement of the sponsorship provisions occurred in the 1930s
during labor disputes with The Kohler Company, and in conjunction with the
payola investigations in the 1950s. See Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 18, at 344
(detailing payola publicity scandal in connection with dispute between National
Association of Manufacturers and Kohler). A former chief of the FCC's now de-
funct Complaints and Compliance Division claims he "directed actual enforce-
ment efforts to prevent the very same types of payola that are being uncovered
today by Mr. Spitzer." Arthur L. Ginsburg, Payola and the FCC, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 3,
2005, at A18. The former chief asserted that responsibility for payola prevention
rests with the FCC, and the New York investigation highlights the Commission's
failure to protect the public. See id. (arguing Commission should have greater po-
lice role).
The FCC applies a two dimensional test to scrutinize potential violations of
section 317, analyzing the amount of consideration exchanged and the amount of
sponsorship identification broadcast. See Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 18, at
359 (describing FCC's two-part test). Where the amount exchanged and the
amount of identification broadcast are both extensive, disclosure is required. See
id. (setting forth rubric for FCC scrutiny). Disclosure is not required where both
elements are limited. See id. (discussing application of new section 317(a)(1)).
Where the amount of one element is high and the other is low, the situation is
reconciled by close scrutiny. See id. (noting FCC's interpretations). Violations can
result in criminal penalties, including fines up to $10,000, one year imprisonment
or both, as well as administrative sanctions and nonrenewal of license. See Com-
mission Warns Licensees About Payola and Undisclosed Promotion, 4 F.C.C.R.
7708, 7709 (citing United States v. Vega, 447 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1971)) (explaining
penalties for infractions). Yet the FCC acts only if a formal complaint is filed alleg-
ing that a station is receiving payment in violation of the laws. See Boehlert, supra
note 84 (wondering who would raise complaints over such profitable system).
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payola scandals and, therefore, it is likely the FCC will pay closer attention
to its licensees following the recent Sony investigation. 99 Such inattentive
enforcement of FCC rules provides no incentive for radio or record com-
panies to change their ways. 10 0 This lack of enforcement, coupled with
the apathy of audiences toward payola, also creates a strong argument
against the merit of anti-payola statutes.101
Lack of apparent injury to the listener is not a defense to a violation of the disclo-
sure provisions. See N. Pac. Radio Corp., 40 F.C.C. 138 (1960) (holding that lack of
awareness of responsibility is also not justification for failure to disclose).
Further, the Government is not required to produce proof of actual broadcast
of the material for which consideration was exchanged; rather, the plain language
of the statute looks only to whether the defendant paid money for the purpose of
having material broadcast. See United States v. Goodman, 945 F.2d 125, 129 (6th
Cir. 1991) (holding Government did not have to prove actual broadcast). In
United States v. Goodman, the defendant was convicted of bribing radio station pro-
grammers to incorporate songs he was promoting into their playlists in violation of
section 508. See id. at 126-27, 129 (detailing charges). The defendant argued that
section 508 required actual broadcast of the material, or in the alternative, that the
Government failed to prove he intended the songs to be broadcast. See id. at 128-
29 (claiming without actual broadcast or proof of intent there was no violation).
The court rejected both of these theories, holding that the plain language of the
statute requires proof only of payment for the purpose of broadcast of the mate-
rial, and the payments proffered by the defendant contemplated actual broadcast.
See id. at 129 (finding paying to have songs placed on playlists sufficient to contem-
plate broadcast).
99. See Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 18, at 344 (describing FCC disclosure
enforcement); Philips, supra note 91 (stating FCC last looked into payola practices
following series of stories in Los Angeles Times). The FCC has already begun to
review the Sony settlement for evidence of payola violations by its licensees. See
US. to Revisit Payola Inquiry, supra note 3 (noting that FCC "will not tolerate non-
compliance"); see also Mohammed, supra note 9 (noting civil penalties could be up
to $32,500 per violation). For a further discussion of the findings of the Sony
investigation, see infra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
100. See Philips, supra note 91 (arguing paltry fines are no deterrent); see also
Boehlert, supra note 84 (reporting complaints from artist managers that Justice
Department fails to investigate situation).
101. See Greene, supra note 1 (arguing modern Americans are unconcerned
with how their music gets to radio). For a further discussion of public apathy to-
wards payola in radio, see infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
Given the difference in public attitude toward payola currently, it does not
appear that payola in radio should receive treatment different from payola in any
other industry. See Katunich, supra note 5, at 673 (analogizing radio to supermar-
kets). In fact, most other industries frequently secure commercial airtime on both
television and radio in order to promote their products. See id. (noting other in-
dustries utilize practices akin to payola). For example, observe the product place-
ment agreements common in motion pictures and television shows. See Greene,
supra note 1 ("Any time you go to the movies and see a brand-name product-a
soft drink, a candy bar, a luxury car-being used by one of the stars, you figure
that a payment has been made."). A business arrangement produced the appear-
ance of that particular good on screen, and "the audience knows it, and has been
conditioned to accept it." See id. (arguing good did not "magically appear" on
screen). In its likely oldest and most common form, payola exists in the slotting
fees paid to supermarkets by manufacturers to achieve prominent shelf space for
their products. See id. ("Pay the money, get your product on the shelf.").
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B. History Repeating: The Continuing Battle Against Payola in Radio102
1. Prelude to the Sony Scandal
The early payola scandals were characterized by bribes made to disc
jockeys who had exclusive control over what songs received airplay. 10 3 As
a result of these controversies, control over playlists was placed in the
hands of radio station executives, putatively to avoid the reach of similar
bribes.10 4 Yet as authorities discovered during the recent Sony investiga-
tion, this shift in power simply allowed for the brokering of large-scale
promotion exchanges at the highest levels of both record companies and
radio stations.'
0 5
Just like pay-for-play in the music industry says nothing about the possible
artistic merit of a song, neither do slotting fees guarantee consumers that the prod-
uct they purchase will be healthy or delicious. See id. (commenting that idea of
payola as acceptable in supermarkets but not radio is illogical). With a successive
movement toward pay-for-play in most industries, it is difficult to justify its
criminalization in the music industry, especially in light of the convoluted black
market system which has been created. See Katunich, supra note 5, at 673 (con-
demning government's apparent mischaracterization of payola).
102. Bill Siddons, manager of both multi-platinum and developing recording
artists, notes:
Payola is institutional these days. Record companies provide financial re-
wards to stations that support their records. Paying for "promotions" is
the easy example. Indie promo exists to serve the needs of stations and
their decision makers. Need court side seats to the basketball game?
Your kids [sic] school supported? A guaranteed job or "consultancy" if
you're fired? Stick with me and add my records!
Reply Comments of American Federation of Musicians, American Federation of
Television and Radio Artists, Future of Music Coalition, The Recording Academy
and the Recording Artists' Coalition, In the Matter of Broadcast Localism, MB
Docket No. 04-233, 12-13 (Jan. 3, 2005), available at http://
www.futureofmusic.org/images/DABreplycomments.pdf [hereinafter Reply
Comments].
103. See Doerksen, supra note 18 (describing deejays as "gatekeepers of pop");
see also Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 3, at 3 (acknowledging disc jockeys
had "significant control" over selection of records).
104. See Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 3, at 5 (observing record
companies' ability to secure airplay nationwide through radio conglomerates); see
also Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 534 (noting payola system would be more
efficient for promoters if they were able to deal with single monopolist instead of
discrete stations).
105. See Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 3, at 5 (arguing sophistica-
tion of payola strategies reflects effects of radio consolidation); see also Doerksen,
supra note 18 (declaring that as control over playlist content moved higher up
corporate ranks prices increased and advantages accrued to larger record
companies).
Complaints of payola practices among the radio conglomerates also bring to
light issues of antitrust violations. See Nobody In Particular Presents, Inc., v. Clear
Channel Commc'ns, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1055 (D. Colo. 2004) (finding
material question of fact as to whether Clear Channel conditioned airplay on use
of Clear Channel promotion services). In early 2001, a Denver concert promoter
brought suit against Clear Channel Communications and its subsidiary entertain-
ment groups. See id. at 1055 (discussing parties as well as procedural posture of
case). The concert promoter alleged that Clear Channel used its position as the
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Payment for broadcasts from record companies to radio stations suc-
cessfully remained under the radar following the close of the 1960 con-
gressional investigation. 10 6 That is, until the late 1980s when an evening
news broadcast brought to light the astoundingly elaborate nexus of inde-
pendent promoters guarding access to radio airwaves. 10 7 In February of
1986, an "NBC Nightly News" report about independent promoters
sparked a renewed federal investigation of payola in the music industry.1 08
In 1989, the Government indicted independent promotion powerhouse
Joseph Isgro on fifty-six counts, varying from RICO violations to payola to
filing false income tax returns. 10 9 During Isgro's 1990 trial in Los Ange-
les-the highest profile case ever developed against an independent pro-
moter-the prosecution presented evidence that drugs and cash were
distributed to programmers in exchange for airplay.110
nation's largest concert producer, entertainment promoter and radio group to in-
timidate and coerce rock artists and their record labels into signing promotional
deals with its subsidiaries. See id. at 1061 (citing testimony that label artists would
not get spins unless Clear Channel promoted artists' concerts, inter alia); Adler,
supra note 32, at 170[C] (documenting actions by other small concert promoters
taking on Clear Channel). In deciding Clear Channel's motion for summary judg-
ment, the court found that evidence demonstrated that radio airplay and radio
promotional support were conditioned on selection of Clear Channel as an artist's
concert promoter, establishing a per se claim of a tying arrangement in violation
of antitrust laws sufficient to survive summary judgment. See Nobody In Particular
Presents, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 1092 (noting failure of alternate tying claim based on
rule of reason analysis).
106. See Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 549 (explaining that by this
point in time independent promotion was in common use). The major federal
criminal prosecution of independent promotion was preceded by several related
investigations. See id. at 549-57 (describing new facets of payola in 1980s). During
this time, the Senate conducted a preliminary investigation, which resulted in a
finding of no credible evidence of specific instances of impropriety. See id. at 552
(finding industry is susceptible to misconduct but not to such level as to warrant
Senate investigation). The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) also
attempted to commence an investigation of payola practices, which it ultimately
abandoned due to lack of member participation. See id. at 555 (asserting no mem-
ber of RIAA wanted to give another advantage by ceasing payola practices).
107. See Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 556 (describing event that in-
creased awareness about payola). For a further discussion of "The Network" of
independent promoters, see id.
108. See Chris Morris, Spitzer on a New Beat With Probe of Music, HOLLYWOODRE-
PORTER.COM, Oct. 23, 2004, available at http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr/
articledisplay.jsp?vnu contentid=1000683244 (summarizing key testimony in
case).
109. See id. (noting Isgro was later convicted of extortion charges unrelated to
promotion work); see also United States v. Isgro, 751 F. Supp. 846, 847 (C.D. Cal.
1990), rev'd, 974 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating all counts on which Isgro was
charged).
110. See Morris, supra note 108 (describing Isgro's illicit exchanges). Wit-
nesses revealed tales of pay-offs of cocaine, cleverly stashed in cassette cases or
record jackets, in exchange for adding records. See id. (reporting methods of
transferring money). Uncompromised testimony at trial exposed payola arrange-
ments between Isgro and a general manager at Los Angeles radio station KIQQ-
FM, with the manager to receive $750 for each of Isgro's songs added to the
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2. The Investigation and Settlement with Sony BMG
In 2004, Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of the State of New York, pro-
voked renewed scrutiny of payola practices when he initiated an investiga-
playlist. See Larry Rohter, At Payola Trial, Primer on Forms and Mechanics, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 25, 1990, at 11 (explaining programmer would typically add from zero to all
of Isgro's songs). The station manager testified that Isgro paid him about
$100,000 per year for at least three years to add records to KIQQ's playlist. See
Carol Baker, They Played the Hits: Were They Paid for It?, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 10, 1990, at
8 (stating other programmers testified to receiving payola from Isgro in cash and
cocaine). The manager also testified that he typically received the cash "on a
weekly basis from Mr. Isgro or his bodyguard . .. in the men's room at bars [he]
would frequent." Id. At the pinnacle of his career as an independent promoter,
Isgro had ten million dollars worth of billings to record companies. See id. (detail-
ing excerpts from Isgro's trial). Prices per song have increased since Isgro's trial-
starting rates are approximately $1,000 per song and up to $8,000 if a label is
particularly desperate for airplay. See Boehlert, supra note 21 (recounting in-
stances where particularly desperate record company offered $2,500 for airplay).
The indictment was later dismissed by the district court on a finding that pros-
ecutors had attempted to hide "wildly contradictory" grand jury testimony from
one of their witnesses. See id. (objecting to prosecution's attempt to play down
contradictory grand jury testimony); see also Isgro, 751 F. Supp. at 846 (dismissing
for prosecutorial misconduct and fundamental unfairness). A federal court of ap-
peals judge reversed the dismissal of the indictment, holding that while "[t]he
prosecutor's misconduct before the District Court 'clearly rose to an intolerable
level,' and the court would be justified in considering alternative means of sanc-
tioning the prosecutor... dismissing the indictment was an unwarranted 'windfall'
to the defendants." Dismissal of Charges Against Record Promoter Joseph Isgro and Two
Other Parties Is Reversed, Er. L. REP., Mar. 1993, at 1 (stating holding); see United
States v. Isgro, No. 90-50531, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 30916 (9th Cir. Nov. 25, 1992),
rev g, 751 F. Supp. 846 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (reinstating indictment). Seven years later
the indictment was again dismissed, this time on claims that the prosecution vio-
lated the Speedy Trial Act, following grand jury investigations in five cities and a
total cost of ten million dollars to taxpayers. See Chuck Philips, Company Town: A
Payola Probe with No Payoff, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1996, at D6 (reporting high cost of
trial that put no one behind bars).
In 1999, both the president and promotion chief of Latin record company
Fonovisa, pleaded guilty and were fined on tax fraud charges associated with pay-
ments made to a Spanish-language radio station. See Morris, supra note 108 (re-
porting label executives claimed they were unaware that regulations prohibited
such actions in United States as such payments were common in Mexico). The
programmer later admitted to receiving more than $200,000 in payola. See id.
(describing outcome of prosecution). Nevertheless, this investigation received lit-
tle official attention, and Spitzer's probe into payola practices among the major
record labels and radio stations in New York marks the "first serious inquiry into
possible record industry promotion abuses" since the early 1990s. See id. (noting
influence of independent promoters has waned in recent years).
In 2002 and 2003, Cox Radio and Clear Channel Communications both cut
their ties with independent promoters. SeeJeff Leeds, Clear Channel to Cut Promoter
Ties, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2003, at BUSI (describing action as abrupt reversal for
conglomerate); Morris, supra note 108 (reporting announcements by both compa-
nies). The break was not wholly innocent, however, as Clear Channel announced
plans to sell music-related services itself, instead of through independent promot-
ers. See Leeds, supra (reporting Clear Channel sees "better formula" for promo-
tions between radio and record companies); see alsoJesse Hiestand, Clear Channel
Takes Antipayola Step, HOLLYWOODREPORTER.COM, Apr. 10, 2003, available at LEXIS,
THR File (noting perception often worse than actual level of payola).
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tion into practices relating to the promotion of music to radio stations.11
The probe involved subpoenas to all four major record companies, as well
as most of the large radio conglomerates. 1 2 The investigation revealed
that Sony had illegally provided radio stations with financial benefits to
obtain airplay and boost chart positions for its songs, through both direct
deals between high-level Sony and radio executives, and indirect payments
made via independent promoters.' 1 3 The inquiry also revealed that Sony
used a significant portion of its promotion budget to purchase airplay, to
such an extent that senior label executives were frequently involved in the
transactions.' 
1 4
When Sony provided items to radio stations, ostensibly as contest
prizes, its promotion department employees went to considerable lengths
to conceal the fraudulent transactions from the accounting systems, even
going so far as to solicit false names and social security information from
the radio programmers actually receiving the gifts. 115 In addition to brib-
111. See Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 3, at 1 (describing course of
investigation). See generally Susan Butler, Spitzer Probes Radio, Label Links, BILL-
BOARD, Nov. 6, 2004, available at LEXIS, BILLBD File (reporting start of Eliot
Spitzer's investigation).
112. See Morris, supra note 108 (reporting almost all parties issued statements
regarding their compliance); see also Paul Heine & Bill Holland, Spitzer Still Looking,
BILLBOARD, Mar. 25, 2005, available at LEXIS, BILLBD File (reporting artists'
groups thrilled at attention garnered by investigation). The major parties subpoe-
naed in the Attorney General's investigation included: Sony BMG Music Entertain-
ment, Vivendi Universal Music Group, Warner Music Group, EMI Group, Clear
Channel Communications, Cox Communications, Entercom, Emmis Broadcasting
and Infinity Broadcasting. See Morris, supra note 108 (stating EMI emphasized its
written policy against payola).
113. See Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 3, at 2 (observing aggressive
promotion tactics employed at Sony labels). Such practices included: (1) bribing
radio station employees; (2) purchasing equipment, paying off invoices and pro-
viding free concerts for radio stations; (3) providing vacation packages, electron-
ics, gift cards and other valuable consideration under the guise of contest
giveaways; and (4) using independent promoters to funnel illegal payments to ra-
dio stations, all on the condition of receiving airplay. See id. (documenting Sony's
infractions).
114. See id. at 8 (reporting senior executives "tolerated and facilitated" payola
practices among Sony labels); see also Charles Duhigg, Hitmakers Implicated in 'Pay
for Play'Plans, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2005, at Al (reporting Los Angeles Times investiga-
tion revealed two of Sony's highest-ranking executives directly implicated in New
York payola probe).
115. See Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 3, at 9-11 (revealing give-
aways provided to programmers were typically classified as contest prizes). The
government requires that winners of prizes above a certain value submit their
names and social security numbers for tax purposes. See id. at 9 (noting SONY
BMG employees were given false names and social security numbers). For exam-
ple, in November 2002, a flat screen TV was provided to a Clear Channel program
director. See id. at 10-11 (providing example of gifts given to programmers). Sony
label Epic Records' Executive Vice President of Promotion solicited a fictitious
winner name and social security number, and instructed his staff to classify the
transaction as a contest giveaway. See id. (discussing method of concealing true
nature of gift). On another occasion, promotions employees at Epic resorted to
falsifying purchase orders for items-such as roundtrip airfare and accommoda-
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ing individual radio programmers, Sony regularly provided "promotional
support" to radio stations in exchange for airplay of its songs. 1 6 Sony also
negotiated such exchanges with radio corporations such as Infinity radio
stations, resulting in a nationwide swath of radio stations adding and play-
ing Sony label songs.
117
Moreover, the investigation revealed that Sony had utilized various
techniques to artificially increase the position of its artists on nationwide
record charts.1 18 For example, Sony hired independent promoters. 1 19
tions in Ft. Lauderdale for a Buffalo programmer-to avoid raising questions with
the accounting department. See id. at 9 (finding Epic Records frequently provided
programmers with valuable items in exchange for airplay).
116. See id. at 13 (describing promotional support to station as equally effec-
tive as direct bribes to programmers). Stations use promotional support either to
assist with operating costs or to provide contest giveaways of their own. See id. at 13
(explaining how stations utilize promotional money). Both reduce overhead and
draw listeners, thus boosting the station's Arbitron ratings and its ability to draw
advertisers. See id. (noting support frequently influences programming decisions
yet is not disclosed to public); see also Sony Correspondence, supra note 8, at SONY
00173236 (TV and DVD radio players); id. at SONY 00161374, 00216512-14,
00210741 (laptop); id. at SONY 00113917, 00173233 (flyaway packages); id. at
SONY 00041740, 00173185 (promotional dollars); id. at SONY 00041740,
00150763 (digital cameras); id. at SONY 00173209 (concert tickets); id. at SONY
00229582-83, 00164447 (passes for a promotional appearance by Kelly Rowland);
id. at SONY 0014166 (passes for a promotional appearance byJessica Simpson). In
return for such gifts and promotional support, Sony sought actual spin commit-
ments from the radio stations. See Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 3, at 15
(reporting commitments are used to hold stations accountable for promotional
support received). A "spin commitment" is an agreement from the radio program-
mer to play a song a minimum number of times, usually at specified times during
the day. See id. (defining spin agreements). Sony would then monitor and enforce
those spin commitments by using one of the electronic airplay monitoring services,
such as BDS. See id. (explaining Sony's use of monitoring to enforce agreements
with radio). For a further discussion of the use of airplay monitors, see supra note
78 and accompanying text.
117. See Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 3, at 17 (observing deal with
Infinity radio stations for Celine Dion's "Goodbye's (The Hardest Word)"). One
internal email from an Epic Records executive angered by stations' time assign-
ments for a new single by Celine Dion states:
OK, HERE IT IS IN BLACK AND WHITE, AND IT'S SERIOUS: IF A
RADIO STATION GOT A FLYAWAY TO A CELINE [DION] SHOW IN
LAS VEGAS FOR THE ADD, AND THEYRE PLAYING THE SONG ALL
IN OVERNIGHTS, THEY ARE NOT GETTING THE FLYAWAY. PLEASE
FIX THE OVERNIGHT ROTATIONS IMMEDIATELY.
Sony Correspondence, supra note 8.
118. See Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 3, at 18-23 (discussing find-
ings). For a further discussion of the ways in which Sony artificially boosted the
position of songs on record charts, see infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
119. See Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 3, at 18-22 (noting indepen-
dent promoters, while hired by record companies, have direct, regular access to
programmers). Independent promoters often have a financial relationship with
particular radio stations that typically takes the form of money and items of value
from record companies funneled through the independent promoter to the sta-
tion. See id. at 18-19 (describing transfer of money from record company to radio
station). The independent promoter retains a percentage of the amount before
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Promotion department documents articulated detailed policies requiring
a minimum number of spins before payment would be rendered to an
independent promoter.120 Likewise, Spitzer discovered that Sony regu-
larly purchased radio airtime to increase airplay of its songs and artificially
boost the chart position of its artists through a practice known as "spin
programs." 12 1 Finally, Sony manipulated chart positions for its songs
through the use of paid commercials. 1
2 2
Following the above revelations, Sony agreed to a settlement with New
York authorities. 123 As part of its settlement terms, Sony acknowledged
passing the payments along to the radio station. See id. at 19 (constituting payment
for services). Funds reach the radio station as either straightforward monthly fees
or through more sophisticated methods whereby stations draw on Sony funds held
by the promoters to pay station expenses. See id. at 19 (commenting that "indies"
sometimes pass along promotional items as well).
120. See Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 3, at 21 (stipulating required
numbers of spins); Sony Correspondence, supra note 8 (detailing market size and
number of spins required for payment). The investigation revealed that Sony had
relationships with both exclusive and non-exclusive independent promoters. See
Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 3, at 19 (explaining difference between
promoters). Both were compensated with retainer fees and, in the case of exclu-
sive promoters, with additional add fees for each time a promoter's radio station
added a Sony song to its playlist. See id. (reporting fees paid to independent
promoters).
121. See Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 3, at 22-23 (describing prac-
tice). A spin program is a block of advertising time during which a record com-
pany's music is played. See id. at 22 (defining term). Spin programs are used to
strategically vie for a higher chart position and to boost a song's position when it
shows signs of weakness-chart position often influences record purchasers and
radio stations alike. See id. at 23-24 (explaining value of purchased block of time).
The monitoring services are unable to differentiate between spin programs and
unpurchased airplay; therefore the spin becomes a part of the data used by the
charting companies. See id. at 23 (noting data discrepancies result from this short-
coming). In the past Sony has purchased spin programs for songs such as: "Take
My Breath Away," Jessica Simpson (Columbia Records); "Meant to Live,"
Switchfoot (Columbia Records); "I Don't Want to Be," Gavin DeGraw (J Records);
"Sunday Morning," Maroon 5 (J Records). See id. at 23 (noting Sony's use of spin
programs to vie for higher chart positions).
122. See Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 3, at 24 (noting practice
made possible by broadcast monitoring services). Until 2004, BDS monitoring ser-
vice selected a digital pattern from a portion of each song to act as its identifier so
that when broadcasted, the result was that BDS counted a spin as if the entire song
had been broadcast. See id. (explaining Epic Records' use of this technique); see
also Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 553 (discussing comparison of patterns).
Epic promotion employees were able to determine which portion of a song had
been selected as the "thumbprint"; as a result, by including mere snippets of songs
in 30-second commercials, Epic was credited with full spins of its songs in the data
reported to charting companies. See Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 3, at
24 (describing resulting boost in chart position). In addition, Sony hired interns
and actors to organize fraudulent call-in campaigns to induce increased airplay of
its songs by feigning listener popularity. See id. at 24-25 (noting many radio sta-
tions base playlists or entire radio shows on listener requests).
123. See Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 3, at Exhibit A (detailing
settlement terms). For a more detailed discussion of Sony's settlement, see infra
notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
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that some of its employees had pursued improper promotions prac-
tices. 12 4 Pursuant to the settlement, Sony is now prohibited from: (1) pro-
viding anything of value to radio station employees or listeners, with
certain exceptions, 125 in exchange for airplay or increased airplay; (2) us-
ing spin programs, paid-for advertising or a paid-for spin to generate spin
detections; and (3) using its employees, interns or others to contact radio
stations for purposes of acting as listeners or to manipulate station voting
features in order to request airplay. 12 6 The settlement also penalized the
record company with a provision requiring payment of $100,000 to cover
the costs of the investigation, as well as a requirement that Sony contribute
ten million dollars to the Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors.
127
Notwithstanding the settlement, Sony is still permitted to continue
working with independent promoters, provided that the promoters ad-
here to the terms of the settlement. 128 In order to ensure conformity with
124. See Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 3, at Exhibit A. The exhibit
provides:
Despite federal and state laws prohibiting unacknowledged payment by
record labels to radio stations for airing of music, such direct and indirect
forms of what has been described generically as "payola" for spins has
continued to be an unfortunately prevalent aspect of radio promotion.
SONY BMG acknowledges that various employees pursued some radio
promotion practices on behalf of the company that were wrong and im-
proper, and apologizes for such conduct. SONY BMG looks forward to
defining a new, higher standard in radio promotion.
Id.
125. Some examples of permissible activities include:
1. Providing items of value for radio contests or giveaways, on the condition that
the general manager, licensee or owner of the radio station provides a signed
letter verifying that: the item will be given away to people other than radio
station employees or their relatives, an announcement that the item has been
paid for by Sony will accompany the broadcast of the giveaway, and that in-
creased airplay has not been provided in exchange for this item.
2. Purchasing advertising, or paying for broadcast of Sony music in a syndicated
radio program, on the condition that airplay monitoring services are notified
that such broadcasts are not intended for detection by the airplay monitoring
companies.
3. Arranging for artists to appear or perform at events sponsored by radio
stations.
4. Providing nominal consideration such as CDs or concert tickets to familiarize
radio station employees with Sony artists, modest personal gifts for life events
and holidays not to exceed $150 per year, and meals, entertainment and travel
expenses not to exceed 20 trips per radio station per year.
See Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 3, at Exhibit B, IV (detailing permissi-
ble activities).
126. See id. at Exhibit B, III (describing prohibited activities).
127. See id. at 27 (describing philanthropic requirements). The ten million
dollar payment will be distributed to New York State not-for-profit corporations for
the benefit of programs aimed at music education. See id. (describing use of Sony
settlement).
128. See id. at Exhibit B, VI (detailing restrictions on promoter relationships).
Further, Sony is prohibited from reimbursing a promoter for expenses incurred by
the promoter on behalf of a radio station. See id. at Exhibit B, VI(B) (2) (setting
forth further limitations).
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the settlement, Sony must hire a compliance officer and develop a com-
pany-wide set of written standards of conduct. 129 Further, any violation of
the terms of the settlement will constitute prima facie evidence of violation
of the applicable anti-payola laws.'
30
3. Impact of the Settlement on the Record Industry
Following the close of the investigation at Sony, Spitzer reported that
inquiries at other subpoenaed entities would continue.' 31 Likewise,
Spitzer also expressed his hope that the Sony settlement would reflect a
threshold that all record companies will meet in due course. 132 Yet the
question remains, what effect will this settlement with state authorities
have on payola practices on a national level? 133
Previous attempts by record companies to curb payments to indepen-
dent promoters as well as other payola practices have not fared well, and
in fact, were quickly abandoned. 134 In 2001, Sony label, Columbia
Records, shocked members of the industry when it announced a policy
129. See id. at Exhibit B, VIII-IX (setting forth compliance requirements).
The company must also conduct reasonable inquiries into the activities of its em-
ployees and agents. See id. at Exhibit B, 1V(B)-(C) (discussing business reforms
regarding permissible activities). Sony has already fired one senior vice president
of promotion at its Epic label, as well as reprimanding four other executives at
Epic and in its Urban unit with financial penalties and probation. See Duhigg &
Hamilton, supra note 7 (claiming insiders do not expect further firings);Jeff Leeds
& Louise Story, Radio Payoffs Described as Sony Settles, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2005, at Al
(describing reprimands).
130. See Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 3, at 30 (stating New York
Attorney General's strict liability standard).
131. See Duhigg & Hamilton, supra note 7 (reporting intent of New York At-
torney General's Office); Leeds & Story, supra note 129 (describing extent of
payola in industry); Morris & Woodson, supra note 21 (claiming investigation is
"far along" with other entities).
132. See Duhigg & Hamilton, supra note 7 (quoting Attorney General Spitzer);
Leeds & Story, supra note 129 (describing payola as pervasive); Morris & Woodson,
supra note 21 (reporting Spitzer's desires for similar settlements with other record
companies).
133. See Fisher, supra note 2 (observing that large radio conglomerates partici-
pating in Spitzer's probe said they "are committed to rooting out pay-for-play ar-
rangements"). The reporter notes this is "exactly what radio executives have said
every time payola has become a public scandal." Id.; see also Charles Duhigg, Sony
BMG Is Sued by Small Label in 'Pay to Play' Case, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2005, at C6
(reporting small label filed suit against Sony alleging antitrust violations in wake of
New York payola investigation revelations); Charles Duhigg, Clear Channel Fires Two
After Internal Review, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2005, at C3 (reporting Clear Channel
fired two after New York investigation revealed programmers improperly accepted
record company gifts in exchange for broadcast).
134. See Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 549-50 (describing Warner
Brothers failed attempt at terminating use of independent promotion); Eric
Boehlert, The "Bootylicious" Gambit, SAION.COM, June 5, 2001, http://
archive.salon.com/ent/feature/2001/06/05/sony-payola/index.html (chroni-
cling Sony's attempts to end independent promotion services); Boehlert, supra
note 12 (describing failed investigation by RIAA in 1980s).
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that would greatly curtail payments to independent promoters for the new
single from popular artist Destiny's Child.135 Columbia Records declared
they would only pay independent promoters for adds of the single
"Bootylicious" 136 in the top fifty radio markets. 137 Columbia Records' ac-
tions limiting payments to promoters were a risky maneuver in an industry
where record companies are willing to pay extraordinary amounts of
money to garner a competitive edge.138 Two weeks following the release
of "Bootylicious," the song had been added to 113 pop radio stations;
while those numbers were enough to ensure that the song was a bona fide
smash, the group's previous single, "Survivor," 139 debuted at 150 radio sta-
tions.140 The difference, however slight, is estimated to be due to the fact
that when "Survivor" was released to radio, promoters in all markets were
paid. 141 Similarly, in 1981, economic pressures from a particularly power-
ful group of independent promoters known as "The Network" prompted
record companies Warner Brothers and Columbia 142 to launch a boycott
of independent promoter services. 143 When Warner Brothers and Co-
lumbia artists subsequently found promoter-controlled radio stations un-
135. See generally Boehlert, supra note 134 (reporting announcement and in-
dustry reaction).
136. DESTINY'S CHILD, Bootylicious, on SURVIVOR (Sony Records 2001).
137. See Boehlert, supra note 134 (reporting Sony offered to pay $1,000 for
adds only to promoters in top fifty markets). Insiders reported that when a label
has a song it knows will be a hit, the typical response is to pay only for adds in the
first week of release, but in all markets. See id, (commenting that $1,000 is often
only base fee). The theory behind paying independent promoters for songs radio
stations are likely to play anyway is to encourage the efforts of the promoters on a
label's lesser-known acts-or to prevent them from working against all the label's
artists. See id. (comparing Sony's stand as "this war's Fort Sumter").
138. See id. (acknowledging such extraordinary payments are made even amid
accusations of extortion-like practices by radio stations).
139. DESTINY'S CHILD, supra note 136.
140. See Boehlert, supra note 134 (comparing number of stations playing
songs).
141. See id. (describing result as due to "put" pop stations-so known because
they are controlled by promoters who can "'put' whatever they want on the
playlists").
142. Columbia was at that time part of the CBS Music Group. See id. (noting
boycott occurred before Columbia's sale to Sony).
143. See id. (describing these powerful promoters as able to receive three to
four thousand dollars per add); see also Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 549
(reporting record label executives found costs of independent promoters "unbear-
able"). Record companies had not previously attempted to sever ties with indepen-
dent promoters "because each company wanted the next company to do it first."
See id. at 549 (noting that record companies were reluctant to drop independent
promoters unless Warner Communications or CBS took lead). In fact, when
Warner and Columbia cut off payments to independent promoters, their competi-
tion not only refused to follow their lead, they reportedly increased expenditures
on independent promotion. See id. (describing economic hit to two companies
when competition failed to cease payola practices).
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willing to air their songs, the artists jumped ship to labels still willing to pay
for play.1 4
4
Once more, Sony finds itself at a disadvantage in the ultra-competitive
world of music as much of its competition-as yet unconstrained by settle-
ment agreements-continues to pursue lucrative payola practices. 145 Fur-
ther, despite the fact that legislators and artist groups are railing against
the so-called "evils" of payola, Americans seem unlikely and unwilling to
care if money is exchanged in the process of playing songs. 14 6 The shock
that characterized the payola scandals of the 1950s was due to the shatter-
ing of audience perceptions that disc jockeys selected music based on
catchy tunes and artistic quality.147 Today, however, many Americans op-
erate under the assumption that "no one does anything without money
changing hands."148 In light of such public apathy, it seems the rationale
for enacting the payola statutes has become moot.149
144. See Boehlert, supra note 134 (noting artists Loverboy and The Who
among those who left); see also Spitzer Fallout: McClusky Dumps Biz Model, BILLBOARD,
Nov. 12, 2005, available at LEXIS, BILLBD File (reporting independent promoter
powerhouse Jeff McClusky is eliminating system of fees tied to playlists he made
standard operating procedure after New York payola investigation).
145. See Garrity, supra note 2 (commenting that other labels are still free to
purchase lucrative spin programs); see also Brian Garrity, WMG Latest to Pay Up for
Payola, BILLBOARD, Dec. 3, 2005, available at LEXIS, BILLBD File (reporting
Warner Music Group has agreed to five million dollar settlement with New York
authorities following payola investigation). Warner Music Group is the second ma-
jor record company to settle with Attorney General Eliot Spitzer since the start of
the investigation alleging bribery, fraud and illegal payments made to achieve air-
play of songs by its artists. See id. (reporting allegations that WMG record labels
"showered radio programmers with lavish gifts, trips, tickets to high-profile events
and cash in exchange for airplay"). Spizter's investigation revealed WMG used
heavy-weight independent promoters such as Michele Clark Promotions, Jeff Mc-
Clusky and Associates, Tri-State and Lawman Productions and budgeted as high as
$100,000 per song. See id. (noting that smaller size of settlement, timing of an-
nouncement of deal and lack of press were result of WMG's willingness to cooper-
ate); see also Charles Duhigg, Music Firm Settles Probe into Payola, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23,
2005, at C1 (reporting Spitzer's probe revealed record labels were not always initia-
tors of pay-for-play).
146. See Greene, supra note 1 (claiming that exchanging money "assumed to
be the standard way of doing business in the United States").
147. See id. (distinguishing modern reaction to payola); see also Doerksen,
supra note 18 (commenting that authorities and moralists of 1950s "seized on pay-
for-play arrangements to explain, the unfathomable success of such a degraded
musical idiom as rock 'n' roll"). For a further discussion of radio companies' un-
willingness to eliminate illusion of handpicked song selections, see supra note 93
and accompanying text.
148. See Greene, supra note 1 (noting that Americans assume that money
changes hands in most transactions).
149. See Doerksen, supra note 18 (recommending rational set of regulations
recognizing music as business); Greene, supra note 1 (arguing that Americans are
no longer shocked or offended by thought of radio as marketplace).
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C. The Debate: Is There Merit to Anti-Payola Laws?
The debate over payola in radio has existed since the beginning of
the industry itself; as a result, it is important to analyze the strengths and
weaknesses of each position advocating for and against payola restric-
tions. 150 Among the rationales proffered in support of federal regulation
of payments made for broadcast of specific material are the limited nature
of access to radio broadcast and the potential for promotion of aestheti-
cally undesirable music. 15 1 Opponents of the restrictions, however, argue
that radio is simply a market for new albums and should be left to regulate
itself.152 Opponents also argue that payola offers new artists a means of
competing against more established hit-makers in the area of radio
airplay.1
5 3
Those engaging in legally questionable practices often maintain that
there is a difference between payola and the pay-for-play stratagems actu-
ally utilized throughout the industry.15 4 Pay-for-play is essentially an in-
fomercial-like practice in which radio stations bill record companies for
airplay, but notify listeners at the time of broadcast that the song is paid
for, all of which complies with the federal payola regulations.1 5 5 New pay-
for-play deals and other exchanges that would otherwise arguably consti-
tute payola evidence a shift of power in the music business. 156 Regardless
of the technical legality of such practices, many of the same concerns asso-
ciated with traditional payola still exist with respect to these deals.
157
150. See Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 18, at 331 (reporting origins of de-
bate over sponsorship disclosures). The authors note that the sponsorship disclo-
sure provisions of section 317 are the oldest statutory limitations directly impacting
broadcast advertising. See id. (highlighting history and policy of sponsor
identification).
151. See Loveday v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1443, 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (commenting
on rationale for federal regulation); Reply Comments, supra note 102, at 12-13
(asserting need for federal regulation of pay for play).
152. See Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 521 (proposing payola as pricing
mechanism in free market of music industry).
153. See Chuck Taylor, Paid Play Changing Biz Landscape, BILLBOARD, May 9,
1998, available at LEXIS, BILLBD File (describing artist managers amenable to re-
cord-radio partnerships).
154. See Philips & Hiltzik, supra note 88 (quoting Ralph Nader claiming such
deals are payola under different name).
155. See Philips, supra note 32 (distinguishing legal practices from illicit acts).
156. See Philips & Hiltzik, supra note 88 (noting shift of power to large radio
organizations). "Industry mergers have moved the balance of power to radio
groups, which today have the clout to launch a song simultaneously in scores of
markets across the country-or consign it to oblivion." Id.
157. See Chuck Taylor, Pay-for-Play Issue Looms at CRS Some Group Heads Skate
Around Subject, BItajoARD, Mar. 14, 1998, available at LEXIS, BILLBD File (arguing
abuses still possible with practices that comply with federal regulations).
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1. In Favor of Government Regulations of Payola
a. Radio Is Not Available to All
The most frequent argument justifying federal regulation of pay-
ments for broadcast emphasizes the limited availability of access to radio
and its impact on local and new artists. 158 The FCC considers broadcast-
ers to be "temporary trustees of the public airwaves" and, consistent with
this view, the Communications Act instructs the FCC to award licenses on
the condition that licensees serve the public interest.159 In Loveday v.
FCC,160 the court asserted that, "[u] nlike other modes of expression, radio
inherently is not available to all. That is its unique characteristic, and that
is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to governmental
regulation."1 61
Yet the limited access rationale for prohibiting payola espoused by the
government was actually exacerbated by its own action of deregulating the
radio industry via the Telecommunications Act of 1996.162 In the year
following adoption of the Act, "more than 4,000 of the country's 11,000
radio stations changed hands and more than 1,000 corporate mergers
were proposed in broadcasting."1 63 The result is nearly sixty percent of
158. See Loveday v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1443, 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting limited
access makes radio unique); see also Broad. Localism, 19 F.C.C.R. 12,425, 12,425
n.2 (2004) (same); In the Matter of Broadcast Localism: Reply Comments, supra
note 102, at 12-13 (same).
159. See Broad. Localism, 19 F.C.C.R. at 12,425 n.2 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 309(a),
requiring FCC to determine whether public interest will be served when granting
license applications). While his investigation focused on the major record labels,
New York Attorney General Spitzer stated, " [p]ayola is corrosive to the integrity of
competition .... [Radio stations are] the ones who are most fundamentally violat-
ing the public trust." Morris & Woodson, supra note 21.
160. 707 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1983). In Loveday, the district court reviewed a
decision of the FCC appealed by a political action committee. See id. at 1445, 1459
(stating that Petitioner challenged Commission's ruling and holding that Commis-
sion's ruling was not arbitrary or capricious). The political action committee chal-
lenged the FCC's decision that the broadcaster had sufficiently satisfied its duty to
identify the sponsors of paid political advertisements opposing a ballot initiative
that the individual and political action committee supported. See id. at 1445 (stat-
ing challenge to Commission's ruling regarding discharge of duty to identify spon-
sor). The court held that licensees need only exercise reasonable diligence in
determining who was the sponsoring party. See id. at 1457 (deciding to require
more would be impracticable burden).
161. Loveday, 707 F.2d at 1458 (quoting Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319
U.S. 190, 226 (1943)).
162. See Philips & Hiltzik, supra note 88 (describing consolidation of radio
control). See generally Eric Boehlert, Radio's Big Bully, SALON.cOM, Apr. 30, 2001,
http://archive.salon.com/feature/2001/04/30/clearchannel/index.htm (docu-
menting actions which made Clear Channel Communications nation's largest ra-
dio conglomerate).
163. Philips & Hiltzik, supra note 88.
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the nation's radio stations are concentrated in the hands of a single corpo-
rate entity.
164
The extravagant amount of money spent acquiring radio stations re-
quires conglomerates to place greater emphasis on bottom lines, saleable
airtime and alternative streams of revenue, such as legal pay-for-play
deals. 165 Moreover, the payola laws have not reacted to changes in the
music industry-music videos, satellite radio and iPods-that provide al-
ternatives to radio, thereby increasing access to music audiences once lim-
ited by radio's bandwidth, as well as competition and emphasis on bottom
lines among radio conglomerates. 16 6 This combination has resulted in a
further reduction of the number of radio station outlets available to re-
cord labels and others, thus creating additional incentive for labels to pay
any price for access when desperate to get an artist on the public
airwaves. 1 6 7
164. See Boehlert, supra note 162 (reporting that Clear Channel owns 247 of
nation's 250 largest stations); see also Jeff Leeds, Middlemen Put Price on Airplay, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 27, 2001, at BUSI ("With only a handful of major radio companies left,
it is even harder to gain access and get air time for new music acts.").
165. See Taylor, supra note 153 (reporting consolidation economics forces
companies to place emphasis on bottom line). Programmer Dave Douglas of radio
station WAAF Boston notes: "As public companies, there are only two ways to en-
hance your bottom line: increase revenue or buy more stations." Id.
166. See Katunich, supra note 5, at 655 (positing that radio now faces competi-
tion from music videos and internet downloads). Further, listeners are showing
signs of rejecting the playlists proffered by programmers. See Leeds & Story, supra
note 129 (reporting consumers ability to be selective with music choices). The
authors note that "[t]he iPod and other portable devices have begun cutting into
the popularity of radio, and the growth of satellite radio has been putting pressure
on the station owners to play a broader range of music." Id. Notably, Sirius Radio
estimates that as of January 2006 its subscriber base numbers three million; rival
XM Radio expects twice that figure. See Marc Schiffman, Year in Review: Howard
and Jack Spark Format Fips at Radio, BILLBOARD, Dec. 24, 2005, available at LEXIS,
BILLBD File (reporting likelihood of major gains for Sirius with welcome of How-
ard Stern). Moreover, Apple's iPod has inspired changes in radio formats as a
result of its podcasting and shuffle features. See id. (reporting stations mimicking
iPod's "shuffle" function have improved ratings). As a result of new alternatives to
radio and the cloud of Attorney General Spitzer's payola investigations and settle-
ments, radio is experiencing a generalized decline in audience and even in stock
value. See id. (explaining that radio is aggressively reinvesting in itself to combat its
losses). The problem of limited airspace threatened by new technologies is not a
recent one-"[i]n 1982, [Warner Music Group] declared: 'MTV's role as an alter-
native source for musical programming is additionally significant in the face of
radio playlists and formats that have become increasingly narrow in the past sev-
eral years."' Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 563-64.
167. See Katunich, supra note 5, at 654 (stating pressure on radio stations and
record companies encourages payola). See generally David Hinckley, Stations Con-
sider SongAds, DAILY NEWS (NEw YORK), Mar. 13, 2001, at 81 (asserting Clear Chan-
nel's new efforts to draw revenue from record companies is evidence of muscle of
consolidation). Clear Channel was formulating plans to offer record companies
short ads following the airing of their artists' songs-for a price. See id. (reporting
Clear Channel looking to enter promotions market itself). So-called "back an-
nouncing" used to be a common practice for deejays; now saddled with debts from
numerous mergers, conglomerates like Clear Channel are seeking to increase reve-
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b. Permitting Payola Forces "Bad Music" on Listeners
At the Twenty-Ninth Annual Country Radio Seminar, keynote speaker
Garth Brooks stated, "I would love to hear all the things we hear on radio
[because] we love them, not because we can afford them."168 This state-
ment highlights another common argument in favor of regulation of
payola: payment for broadcast results in mediocre radio. 169 Critics of pay-
for-play practices fear that radio airtime allocation will not be based on
audience research, sales and listener requests, but rather on which record
company has the most disposable money.1 70 Further, critics note that, if
pay-for-play transactions are permitted, radio will become one long series
of infomercials. 17 1
Critics also note that such practices threaten not only the quality of
music propagated by radio, but also the livelihood of those who create and
package music. 172 The escalating costs of direct payola campaigns and
independent promoters are likely to drive smaller independent labels out
of business.17 3 Independent labels have expressed concern about the pay-
for-play systems currently in place at most radio stations, as well as those
pushed by larger labels; their concern is especially due to the fact that
playlists are increasingly controlled by fewer and fewer programmers. 174
Independent record labels find themselves unable to compete with the
"majors" because they lack the funds required to support independent
promoters from week to week. 175 Yet small labels are not the only compa-
hue any way they can. See id. (same). Clear Channel CEO Randy Michaels notes,
"The industry spends a tremendous amount of money promoting records .... We
have an opportunity to take some of that and put it in our books." Id.
168. Taylor, supra note 157.
169. See Katunich, supra note 5, at 671 (articulating critics' fears that airtime
would go to highest bidder).
170. See id. (claiming radio stations could extort money from record compa-
nies to do job they are licensed to).
171. See id. (arguing each paid for song "is akin to a commercial exchange").
172. See id. (asserting small record labels might be driven out by escalating
promotions costs); see also Reply Comments, supra note 102, at 12-13 (claiming new
artists find it difficult to compete with large labels with equally large bank rolls).
173. See Katunich, supra note 5, at 671 (asserting that small record companies
may disappear because they cannot pay costs of independent promotion); Jeff
Leeds, Small Record Labels Say Radio Tunes Them Out, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2001, at
BI (noting large labels can offset promotional costs with star artists). Independent
record labels number about 500-a significant portion of the forty billion dollar
per year record industry. See id. (describing prevalence of independent labels).
174. See Leeds, supra note 173 (claiming corporate radio is unwilling to risk
ratings on unknown artists). Jeff Robinson, sole proprietor of tiny label Third
Monk Records, says, "if you can't get exposure for your product, you'll never be
able to sell any records." Id. For a further discussion of radio consolidation's ef-
fects on availability of outlets, see supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
175. See Reply Comments, supra note 102, at 12-13 (quoting Bill Siddons,
comments filed in FCC's Notice of Inquiry). Don Rose, president of the American
Association of Independent Music says, "[i]t's obvious to us that we're not getting
the fair share because of embedded relationships with big radio." Leeds & Story,
supra note 129.
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tries feeling the pinch of increasing promotion costS. 1 7 6 A senior promo-
tions executive at Dreamworks Nashville argues: "If radio wants us to pay
for every time we're played on the radio, they should probably help us pay
for all the recording costs, artist development costs, etc. If they just want
to have whoever has the most money to throw around get the most airplay,
there's a bad imbalance.
1 7 7
Nevertheless, none of the above arguments adequately recognizes the
basic economic principle that most transactions are predicated on the the-
ory of supply and demand.178 The theory implies that, for record compa-
nies to continue paying radio stations for airtime, the stations must attract
enough listeners to make the payments economically viable for the record
company. 179 Moreover, a radio station that fails to attract listeners risks
losing not only the funds provided by record labels, but also the primary
revenue source provided by traditional advertisers.180 As a result, there is
an economic incentive for radio stations to continue to make program-
ming decisions based on the perceived artistic merit and entertainment
value of a song even in the presence of pay-for-play exchanges. 18 1
176. See Taylor, supra note 157 (documenting that big labels bear most costs
associated with artist promotion).
177. Id.
178. See Katunich, supra note 5, at 671 (stating law of supply and demand
governs); Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 566 (arguing Congress and FCC
.prevented an efficient market from developing").
179. See Katunich, supra note 5, at 671-72 (theorizing record companies will
not pay for radio time with inadequate audience). The commentator states:
Record labels supply money to radio stations through intermediary inde-
pendent promoters based on the expectation that the paid influence will
ultimately further the sale and popularity of the artist's album. For pay-
ment to continue, the radio station must produce; that is, it must attract a
steady stream of listeners to make it economically wise for the record
company to continue to pay the fee. Radio stations that fail to play
"good" music run the risk of alienating listeners.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The commentator further notes that a screening process
exists at the start of the decision-making process when record labels decide
whether to spend money on developing a newly discovered artist. See id. (asserting
this prevents glut of so-called "bad music").
180. See Matthew S. DelNero, Long Overdue?: An Exploration of the Status and
Merit of General Public Performance Right in Sound Recordings, 6 VAND. J. ENT. L. &
PRAc. 181, 197 (2004) (noting that "primary economic motivation" for radio
broadcasters is income, not "beneficent promotion of records"); Darryl Morden,
Rosen Puts RIAA 's Spin on Today's Music Issues, HOLLYWOODREPORTER.COM, Mar. 15,
2002, available at LEXIS, THR File ("A recent consumer survey shows that 34% of
the public now gets music for free.., and 24% don't buy more music because they
can't find the product they want.").
181. See Katunich, supra note 5, at 672 (asserting such theories fail to account
for economic pressures that would prevent radio stations from broadcasting "bad"
music). "Critics of today's pop music falsely equate the corporate admission that
millions were spent trying to alter radio station playlists as a sign that the sounds
now dominating radio are being forced on us .... [Sony is] interested in selling
records . . . . The power in determining hits rests with the public." Robert
Hillburn, Critic's Notebook: The Public, Not Payola, Rules the Air, L.A. TIMES, July 29,
2005, at El.
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2. In Opposition to Government Regulations of Payola
a. Radio Is a Commodity Market
Record companies view the public airwaves not as a trusteeship, but as
a commodity.18 2 Payola, absent the complications created by independent
promoters, serves a legitimate purpose "in an industry where finite airtime
requires that purely economic decisions be made."' 8 3 As a commodity
market, advocates say that the market will regulate itself; that is, too much
substandard music will diminish radio listenership and thereby diminish
advertising rates.1 8 4 Notably, this view is not limited to record companies;
one commentator notes that "[t] he prevailing school of thought at Clear
Channel appears to be that radio stations are mere supermarkets, with
airtime a commodity to be bought and sold like shelf space." 18 5
As a result, many proponents of pay-for-play argue that legalizing the
exchanges would remove the high costs associated with the current
scheme and promote efficiency and accountability.1 8 6 Artist managers
claim that the money currently spent on free radio shows would be better
spent on legitimate pay-for-play programs, arguing that if at the end of
such a deal the audience liked the song, radio stations would continue to
play it with no further incentive from the label.18 7 In essence, "[p]ay for
182. See Leeds & Story, supra note 129 (noting difference between artist and
record labels). But see Boehlert, supra note 21 ("[R]adio isn't really retail-that's
what the record stores are."). Boehlert notes that radio is a truly unique entity in
the music industry in that it is both an independent force and the only tried-and-
true way for record companies to ensure a record's success. See id. (emphasizing
importance of radio airplay to artists and labels). Radio can be characterized, how-
ever, as a market in relation to the record companies that seek its services. See
Nobody In Particular Presents, Inc., v. Clear Channel Commc'ns Inc., 311 F. Supp.
2d 1048, 1079 (D. Colo. 2004) ("In such a market, the radio station is the seller of
radio airplay of an artist's songs.").
183. See Katunich, supra note 5, at 670 (noting role payola plays in economic
aspect of music industry).
184. See id. at 672 (theorizing that broadcasting substandard music would
drive away listeners and ratings); Strauss, supra note 93, at Al (noting same).
185. Lomax, supra note 81. Lomax notes that in this view, "songs are com-
mercials for the CDs that carry them." Id.
186. See Taylor, supra note 153 ("Some claim the new deals will replace the
age-old practice of labels privately offering radio programmers expensive trips and
lavish gifts in exchange for airplay, thus provoking honor out of admission."). See
generally Chuck Taylor et al., Pay-for-Play Sparks Debate of Where Labels' Money Goes,
BILLBOARD, May 9, 1998, available at LEXIS, BILLBD File (describing record labels'
attempts to confront issues of how direct pay-for-play will affect various facets of
music business).
187. See Strauss, supra note 93 (claiming legitimate pay-for-play deals are more
efficient use of record company dollars). Jeff Kwatinetz, manager of rock group
Limp Bizkit, points out that:
[B]ands often find themselves forced to play concerts sponsored by radio
stations for little or no money to either get added to a station's playlist or
to keep from getting dropped from it. "I'll be looking at a Limp Bizkit
tour and the itinerary will say 'Boston, Hartford, New York,' and I'll get a
call that says we have to play this radio-station show on the West Coast. So
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play is the idea that all of the subtle quid pro quo that was going on in the
past bubbles to the surface and becomes a line item in people's
budgets."1 88
Moreover, direct pay-for-play would allow small independent records
labels to compete with major record labels currently controlling promo-
tions markets. 189 Some independent record labels and artists would
rather see legitimized pay-for-play deals put into place in order to ensure
accountability on the part of radio for the consideration exchanged. 19 0 It
is argued that, by bringing payola out of backrooms and into the open,
opportunism will decrease and parties will be forced to perform their end
of the bargain. 19 1
Yet this purely economic view of radio has deficiencies.192 First, it
fails to account for the impact that deregulation would have on small inde-
pendent labels or up-and-coming artists who may be unable to afford the
we have to cancel Boston, fly the band out and at the end of the day it
ends up costing $20,000 to $25,000."
Id.
For example, in 1998, Washington radio station KUFO-FM and record label
Flip/Interscope Records arranged a deal whereby the label paid the radio station
$5,000 to play Limp Bizkit's "Counterfeit" fifty times during a five week period. See
Taylor, supra note 153 (describing arrangement). The spins were accompanied by
the appropriate sponsorship announcements. See Strauss, supra note 93 (noting
paid play was immunized by appropriate announcements). While the particular
song did not ignite a fan frenzy over Limp Bizkit at the time, the band later went
on to dominate the charts with further releases. See id. (acknowledging arrange-
ment did not have desired effect of propelling band to immediate stardom).
One organizer of this deal believes that such agreements help allocate the risk
of breaking a new single between radio stations and record labels. See id. (claiming
radio takes serious risks when playing new songs). Likewise, Tom Barnes, who was
also instrumental in negotiating the pay-for-play deal, believes such agreements are
a method of "using money as lubrication to get more artistically advanced music
on the air and helping formats stretch their boundaries." See id. (discussing posi-
tive effects of promotions).
188. Strauss, supra note 93.
189. See Katunich, supra note 5, at 673 (noting that direct pay-for-play would
eliminate hidden costs associated with free concerts, trips and giveaways).
190. See Taylor, supra note 153 (discussing views of independent labels on di-
rect pay-for-play promotions). Independent record label president Don Rose
notes:
My view is that we're already paying for play . . . .Except the way the
current system operates, there's no accountability. So I would actually
welcome an environment where I knew exactly how much it costs to get
my record played on "X" radio station and I knew the price I was being
charged was the same as what the majors were being charged.
Id.; see also Jacob Slichter, The Price of Fame, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2005, at A23
(describing ambiguities about where band's promotional expenses accrue).
"[O]ther shady methods were employed on our [Semisonic's] behalf-'You don't
want to know,' one person on the MCA promotion staff told me." Id.
191. See Taylor, supra note 153 (supposing that deals in view of all players are
more likely to be above-board).
192. For a discussion of the deficiencies, see infra notes 193-96 and accompa-
nying text.
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market price.193 Such a view also disregards the legislative desire to main-
tain public interest on local airwaves. 194 Opponents contend that eco-
nomically-based practices "clos[e] the door to local artists, beginning
artists and anyone without the major financial clout of the major [record
companies]."' 9 5 Finally, artists and record companies are not the only
parties bearing the costs of pay-for-play tactics-the fans are also affected
by resulting increases in album prices.
1 96
b. Payola Provides Opportunity for Artists to Be Heard
Some artists dread a day when money or performances can no longer
buy airtime. 197 Those artists, and their managers, theorize that it is impos-
sible to purchase a hit song; rather, pay-for-play allows artists to purchase a
chance for a song to become a hit.198 Such views are only encouraged in a
system where independent promoters further the notion that a career is
impossible without the promoters' benevolence, provided in exchange for
consideration. 19 9 Proponents argue that if record labels were free to ne-
gotiate above-board deals for specified amounts of airplay with radio, inde-
pendent promoters would return to their roles as information brokers,
thereby reducing costs and opening the market to new artists.
20 0
V. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
At the fall 2005 Future of Music Coalition Policy Summit, artists, law-
yers, promoters and even an assistant deputy attorney general gathered to
discuss the future of pay-for-play practices between record labels and radio
193. See Reply Comments, supra note 102, at 8 (arguing deregulation would
unfairly favor major labels). The American Federation of Musicians, American
Federation of Television and Radio Artists, Future of Music Coalition, The Record-
ing Academy and the Recording Artists' Coalition weighed in against pay-for-play
tactics in response to an FCC Notice of Inquiry, stating that, "any barriers to worthy
independent and local artists['] ... access [to] the commercial airwaves are wrong,
as a matter of equity, fair trade and serving consumers." Id. at 12.
194. See Notice of Inquiry, In the Matter of Broadcast Localism, 19 F.C.C.R.
12,425, 12,425 (adopted June 7, 2004) (describing localism as decades-old comer-
stone of broadcast regulation).
195. See Reply Comments, supra note 102, at 13 (describing how local artists
are frequently shut out of radio stations in favor of artists with major label
backing).
196. See Slichter, supra note 190 (noting that fans face higher retail costs for
albums resulting from payola). For a further discussion of the costs associated with
payola practices and who bears them, see supra notes 80-82 and accompanying
text.
197. See Slichter, supra note 190 ("How will new bands get played?").
198. See id. ("The longer something new is on the air, the greater the chance
that people will grow to like it.").
199. See Katunich, supra note 5, at 665 (explaining that different stages of
artist careers alter amounts of payment required).
200. See id. at 673 (arguing that removing speculative aspects of pay-for-play
would encourage record labels to take risks on fresh music).
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stations. 20 1 This meeting of the minds aside, it seems unlikely that the
opposing viewpoints will ever reach a common ground on the subject of
government regulation of payola. 20 2 Assuming, arguendo, that payola regu-
lations are necessary, there are conflicting views regarding how these re-
strictions should be crafted.
In their response to an FCC Notice of Inquiry, Respondents Record-
ing Artists' Groups ("Groups") called for the FCC to "take immediate ac-
tion to confront the ongoing and insidious practice of pay for play by
issuing specific rules that forbid particular kinds of behavior." 20 3 Further,
the Groups noted that pay-for-play practices have a "history of mutating."
Therefore, they argued that the FCC should craft new rules that are
"broad and flexible enough to adapt to changes in industry practices." 20 4
Conversely, other scholars advocate a complete deregulation of pay-
for-play practices in radio.20 5 A deregulation theory would permit un-
restricted payment to radio stations, coupled with the ability to contractu-
ally enforce the promise of specified airplay.20 6 These scholars advocate
for direct disclosure of payments only to trade publications and the FCC,
201. See Future of Music Coal., Future of Music Policy Summit, Sept. 13, 2005,
http://www.futureofmusic.org/events/summit05/panelIl.cfm (announcing
panel participants and topic); see also Music Activists Call for Payola Crackdown,
COMMC'Ns DAILY, Sept. 15, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 14500860 [hereinafter
Music Policy Summit] (reporting on Future of Music Policy Summit). Panelists in
the session included: Neda Ulaby, Reporter, National Public Radio (moderator);
Jared Ball, Educator and Journalist; Thomas Hazlett, Professor of Law and Eco-
nomics, George Mason University; Jeff McClusky, President and CEO of Jeff Mc-
Clusky & Associates; Don Rose, Acting President of A2IM; Andy Schwartzman,
President and CEO of Media Access Project; and Jacob Slichter, author/drummer,
Semisonic. See Music Policy Summit, supra (noting participants). Opening re-
marks were made by Terryl Brown Clemons, Assistant Deputy Attorney General,
Division of Public Advocacy, New York Attorney General's Office. See id. (provid-
ing list of speakers at event).
202. See Taylor, supra note 153 (noting differences in opinions industry-wide).
"Who's to say that in a year, pay-for-play won't be as pass6 as the FCC's old owner-
ship limits," remarked Paul Miraldi, director of marketing at WAXQ New York. Id.
203. Reply Comments, supra note 102, at 14.
204. See id. (encouraging FCC to adopt rules that will be able to manage ever-
changing industry).
205. See Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 567-68 (decrying authorities'
failure to recognize market for hit singles and payola's role in making market
more efficient).
206. See id. at 569 (arguing this policy would lead industry to adopt standard
contract for radio airplay). The commentators propose more efficient means of
determining listener demand for singles by Billboard and Radio & Records through
indications of gross unit sales. See id. at 567-68 (suggesting weekly clearinghouse of
record sales data). The suggested method is similar to the popularity statistics col-
lected for feature films in theatrical release. See id. at 568 (analogizing suggested
method to current Hollywood statistic keeping). The commentators note that Bill-
board and Radio & Records charts do not adequately indicate the relative market
success of songs throughout the year; further, the time lag in chart publication
minimizes their usefulness to radio programmers. See id. at 567-68 (describing pit-
falls of current data keeping for radio).
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and note that section 317(e) would allow for authorization of such a pro-
cedure. 20 7 Yet deregulated pay-for-play begs the question of whether ra-
dio stations would be willing to relinquish their power to select songs for
airplay to the record labels. 20 8 Furthermore, complete deregulation is not
an appropriate solution because radio stations could rely entirely on pay-
for-play to pay their bills in place of traditional commercial advertising,
thereby increasing the chance of lax attention to programming quality.
20 9
A similar but less drastic alternative involves partial deregulation of
the sponsorship requirements. 2 10 This solution also proposes disclosures
made solely to the FCC, as well as restrictions on the number of spins
available for purchase. 2 11 Advocates of partial deregulation assert that
songs have little value as anything other than advertisements; therefore,
more attention should be placed on the benefits of the market system, such
as the reduction of costs, speculation and corruption. 2 12 Nevertheless,
this proposal fails to account for the FCC's original rationale in imposing
disclosure rules-"that the public know by whom it is persuaded."2 13
In the debate over pay-for-play, positions advocated by the govern-
ment and independent artists are the polar opposite of those taken by
record companies and radio stations.2 14 Further, while payola scandals
may outrage the public, such outrage has yet to result in "significant par-
207. See id. at 570 (concluding that marginal costs for trade publications to
print material would be minimal). "Congress granted the FCC latitude to waive
'the requirement of an announcement' for 'any case or class of cases;"' this could
be construed to allow the FCC to make an exception in the case of songs.
Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 18, at 369 (noting decisions must be based on
"public interest, convenience or necessity" standard touted by FCC as its
touchstone).
208. See Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 570 (claiming radio stations
would not be forced to resign privilege of song selection due to necessary opportu-
nity cost associated with choice of music).
209. See Katunich, supra note 5, at 676-77 (noting deregulation would likely
draw ire from traditional advertising industry).
210. See id. at 676 (claiming total deregulation would exacerbate problems
associated with payola).
211. See id. at 679 (placing more regulatory power in hands of FCC for moni-
toring payments from record label). This theory also places the burden of public
disclosure on the FCC. See id. at 680 (arguing FCC is best suited to responsibility of
public disclosure).
212. See id. at 670 (advocating partial deregulation as more efficient solution
without side-effects of complete deregulation). The commentator suggests atten-
tion is incorrectly placed on the stereotypes commonly associated with payola and
independent promoters. See id. at 674-75 (claiming "record labels may have cor-
nered the market on the catchiest form of commercials available").
213. Termination of "Plugola" Rulemaking and Affirmation of Disclosure Re-
quirement, 76 F.C.C.2d 227, 227 (1980); see Katunich, supra note 5, at 676 (noting
suggested method more akin to business model than public trusteeship).
214. Cf S. 2691, 107th Cong. §2 (2002) (expressing desire for reform of cur-
rent federal payola laws); Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 566-72 (disputing
that outlawing of payola is required to ensure broadcast of new songs based on
artistic merit); Chuck Philips & Michael Hiltzik, Two Officials Urge FCC to Probe Possi-
ble Payola, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1999, at C1 (quoting legislators who claim payola is
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ticipation by public interest groups in the legislative or rulemaking pro-
cess." 2 15 Considering all the factors, neither viewpoint adequately protects
both the listening public and the market and, therefore, resolution of the
payola conflict in the near future seems doubtful.
2 16
The government has ignored the reality of songs as advertisements,
especially given the scarce resource that is free broadcast radio and has
therefore refused to regulate radio as the commodity market it is. 2 17 The
restrictions on payment for broadcast in conjunction with the market
structure of radio have diminished the effectiveness of payola as a pricing
mechanism.2 1 8 Conversely, record labels have dug their own grave, so to
speak, by willfully ignoring the regulations already in place and thereby
increasing the costs to themselves and their artists. 2 19 The prevalence of
payola, combined with the convoluted system it has become, weighs heav-
ily against trusting record labels with even regulated forms of pay-for-
play.220
Neither side has appropriately addressed the need for balance be-
tween radio as a marketplace and radio as a public good.22 1 Nevertheless,
reflection of lack of competition in market); Statement of CommissionerJonathan
Adelstein, supra note 8 (noting airwaves belong to public).
215. See Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 18, at 375 (noting limits of public
reaction).
216. For a discussion of various weaknesses of each suggested approach, see
supra notes 178-81, 192-96 and accompanying text. Further, for a comparison of
the different suggested proposals for payola reforms and the problems associated
with each, see supra notes 201-15 and infra notes 217-25 and accompanying text.
217. See Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 522 (theorizing that Congress
was unaware that payola acts as price mechanism when it outlawed practice).
218. See id. at 572 (asserting that current regulatory scheme has encouraged
opportunistic behavior by independent promoters at record companies' expense).
The commentators further argue that Congress and the FCC have "prevented an
efficient market from developing." Id. at 566. For example, the rules permit re-
cord companies to "lobby broadcasters generally while forbidding them to make
specific efforts on behalf of individual songs." Doerksen, supra note 18.
219. See Boehlert, supra note 12 (reporting that artist groups and RIAA are
calling for investigation of record companies to determine who paid whom and
how much). Artists are resistant to efforts to end the reign of independent pro-
moters for fear they, and not the record companies, will bear the brunt of pro-
moter wrath; the common feeling is that record companies created the problem
and the artists are unwilling to be the targets of repercussions. See id. (reporting
artists feel they remain in weak bargaining position). See generally Brooks Boliek,
Berman Chides Clear Channel: Lawmaker Accuses Radio Company of 'Punishing' Musi-
cians, HOLLYWOODREPORTER.COM, Jan. 23, 2002, available at LEXIS, THR File (as-
serting record companies take improper advantage of superior bargaining
position).
220. See Taylor, supra note 153 ("The way that money gets to radio stations
from record companies is about as inefficient a process as I've ever seen in any
business.").
221. See Saxe & Silberman, supra note 88 (discussing confusion that marks
promotion business). Emmis Communications Executive Vice President of Pro-
gramming Rick Cummings states, "we've always looked at the music industry and
thought there ought to be a better connection .... [The labels] have always as-
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record companies have been given little incentive thus far to change their
practices. 222 As discussed above, the current restrictions are infrequently
enforced and contain several easily exploitable exceptions.
223
Congress and the FCC need to revamp their rules concerning pay-
ment for broadcast in order to acknowledge the economic pressures in the
music industry.2 24 Laws that appropriately recognize the value of radio
airplay to the standard business plan of record companies, yet refrain from
complete deregulation, would better serve the public interest, and the
laws' stated purpose.
225
Kristen Lee Repyneck
sumed we would play their records for free, and our assumption was that they'd
advertise the records we added, but it never seemed to come out that way." Id.
222. See Duhigg & Hamilton, supra note 7 (documenting miniscule fine im-
posed by FCC for large payola violation). This may change following the Sony
inquiry in New York, as the other major record companies still face investigations
of their own practices. See id.; Leeds & Story, supra note 129 (commenting that
some other record companies are not so concerned about impact of Sony
settlement).
223. For a discussion of the exploitable exceptions, see supra notes 63-101 and
accompanying text.
224. See Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 572 (calling for Congress and
FCC to "decriminalize and deregulate the advertising of pop music"); Katunich,
supra note 5, at 684 (calling for compromise and consistency in anti-payola laws).
225. See Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 5, at 571 (claiming payola "serves as a
price system for efficiently allocating scarce advertising capacity for new pop
records"); Katunich, supra note 5, at 684 (calling for recognition of music as busi-
ness balanced with efficiency); Doerksen, supra note 18 (recommending rational
set of regulations that recognize reality of music business and level playing field
allowing broader competition). Doerksen fondly recalls a time during the pioneer
days of rock 'n' roll, "when tiny record labels like Sun briefly had the likes of RCA
on the ropes." See id. (noting further that earlier attempts to quash payola "have
tended to leave the beast stronger").
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